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International Law in National Schools 
RYAN M. SCOVILLE* 
Why is international law ineffective at times in achieving its aims, such as preventing 
human rights abuses, forestalling armed conflict, and ensuring global cooperation 
on matters ranging from the environment to nuclear proliferation? This Article offers 
original empirical research to suggest that an important and underappreciated part 
of the answer lies in legal education. Conducting a global survey on the study of 
international law at thousands of law schools in over 190 countries, the Article re-
veals significant cross-national disparities in the pervasiveness of international legal 
training, and draws on other research to highlight similar variations in instructional 
quality, topical emphases, and ideological orientation.  
The central claim is that these conditions are likely to inhibit the efficacy of inter-
national law. In states where training in international law is widespread, rigorous, 
and supportive of the discipline, universities may contribute materially to norm 
awareness, utilization, and even obedience over the long run. But in the significant 
number of states where training is unavailable or limited, poor in quality, or critical 
of global norms, universities plausibly generate a neutral or opposite effect. More-
over, the fact of cross-national variation in these conditions likely imposes a systemic 
limit on the coherence and value of international law. This analysis suggests an ex-
pansive research agenda for scholars and may carry important implications for U.S. 
law schools, as well as universities and foreign ministries around the world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
International law addresses an array of foreign and domestic issues, but appears 
at times to be ineffective. States have committed inter alia to honor free speech, fight 
transnational crime, protect the environment, and refrain from the offensive use of 
force, but reports of significant violations are not uncommon. Russia invades 
Ukraine.1 North Korea tortures prisoners.2 The Syrian military violates a long-
standing prohibition on the targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure.3 China 
makes unfounded maritime claims in the South China Sea.4 And even in the West, 
respect for human rights is far from complete.5  
Scholars have offered a number of explanations for this state of affairs. Some 
point to the absence of centralized enforcement as a major contributor. On this view, 
international norms are at times ineffective because there is no supranational govern-
ment with power and authority to force compliance.6 In contrast, others have argued 
that domestic political conditions play a part—in states where there is no internal 
rule of law, leaders are less likely to respect external legal constraints on their behav-
ior.7 Still others contend that inadequate financial and informational resources limit 
the capacity of states to honor international obligations,8 or that major international 
institutions feature design defects that compromise the perceived legitimacy of the 
                                                                                                             
 
 1. David M. Herszenhorn, Fears Rise as Russian Military Units Pour into Ukraine, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2014, at A5. 
 2. Comm’n of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
Rep. of the U.N. Human Rights Council on its Twenty-Fifth Session, ¶¶ 60, 62, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/25/63 (Feb. 7, 2014). 
 3. Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Rep. of the U.N. Human 
Rights Council Thirtieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/48 (Aug. 13, 2015).  
 4. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS, NO. 143, CHINA: MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/44L5-RS5A]. 
 5. See generally AMNESTY INT’L, REPORT 2014/15: THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN 
RIGHTS (2015) (documenting rights violations around the world, including in the West).  
 6. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitu-
tional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1824–26 (2009) (summarizing this 
argument). 
 7. E.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 503, 510 n.13 (1995). 
 8. See generally ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTER-
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998). 
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contemporary order.9 These are important contributions, but they are also incomplete 
as explanations of state behavior.  
The purpose of this Article is to explore international legal education as an addi-
tional determinant of the efficacy of international law. I make two basic claims. First, 
the study of international law varies widely among different parts of the world. Con-
ducting a global survey of curricula at thousands of law schools in over 190 coun-
tries, I reveal drastic fluctuations in the pervasiveness of international legal training 
among national jurisdictions. In some countries, all students must study international 
law prior to joining the legal profession, in others training is optional, and in still 
others it is simply unavailable. These findings dovetail with other research suggest-
ing that training also varies cross-nationally in terms of its quality, topical emphases, 
and ideological orientation. Together, the evidence suggests that the world’s lawyers 
learn about international norms in considerably different ways and to wildly different 
extents. 
As legal systems go, such conditions are aberrational. A U.S. analogy would be 
mandatory and ideologically supportive training in federal constitutional law for all 
lawyers in California and Oregon, with perhaps a heavy emphasis on federalism in 
California and the First Amendment in Oregon; optional and cursory training on the 
subject for lawyers in Texas; no exposure for any lawyers in New York; mandatory 
coverage in Kansas with an unwaveringly communist ideological bent; and pervasive 
training in Indiana from an Islamic perspective. While variation in the domestic con-
text is not altogether absent,10 international law curricula diverge globally to a much 
greater degree because international governing bodies lack authority to standardize 
coursework, the professional networks that contribute to the homogeneity of training 
within a state are much weaker across borders,11 cross-national disparities in wealth 
generate varying levels of educational resources,12 and major legal traditions tend to 
approach university instruction in different ways.13 
The second claim is that current training conditions around the world are likely to 
inhibit materially the efficacy of international law. To state the idea as a hypothetical, 
imagine two countries. In the first, law schools establish multiple courses on inter-
national law as compulsory for all students, ensure that the courses encourage rigor-
ous analysis, and generally frame the discipline in a positive way. Over time, the 
                                                                                                             
 
 9. Cf. U.N. Secretary General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Rep. 
of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶¶ 244–60 U.N. Doc. A/59/565 
(2004) (suggesting that Security Council reform is needed to preserve the institution’s 
legitimacy). 
 10. Harvard Law School, for example, does not require students to take a course on U.S. 
constitutional law. See Requirements for the J.D. Degree, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 
http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/academics/handbook/rules-relating-to-law-school-studies/requirements 
-for-the-j-d-degree/ [https://perma.cc/2CKV-PUTE]. 
 11. Cf. Christopher P.M. Waters, Reconceptualizing Legal Education After War, 101 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 382, 396–403 (2007) (documenting U.N. and civil society efforts to encourage do-
mestic training on international law). 
 12. See infra Part I.B. 
 13. See infra Part I.C; see also Jens Beckert, Institutional Isomorphism Revisited: Con-
vergence and Divergence in Institutional Change, 28 SOC. THEORY 150 (2010) (identifying 
causes of variation). 
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result is an entire generation of lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and other professionals 
who are aware of the relevant issues, proficient in doctrinal basics, and accustomed 
to a pro-compliance message. In the second, training is uncommon or overtly hostile 
toward international law. Would the foreign policies of these states differ? More pre-
cisely, would domestic training features render international law more effective in 
the first state than in the second, all else equal? Drawing on empirical work from the 
fields of social psychology and political science, I argue that there are compelling 
reasons to believe they would. The central thesis—what I will call the “training the-
sis”—is that domestic approaches to the study of international law plausibly influ-
ence the efficacy of international obligations within and among states, with norm 
awareness, utilization, and even compliance rates faring better to the extent that the 
study of international law is pervasive, rigorous, and supportive, and suffering to the 
extent that study is limited, poor in quality, or critical. A corollary is that cross-
national commonalities in training are likely to facilitate amicable foreign relations 
by helping states to settle upon shared understandings of lawful conduct, while cross-
national divergences likely have the opposite effect. These dynamics would suggest 
that pervasive global disparities in the study of international law are a compliance 
problem. 
A couple of premises undergird this claim. One is that formal education is capable 
of ionizing students to act in accordance with views that the state, university, and 
faculty have chosen to privilege within the curriculum. The source of this capacity is 
that effective training can socialize its recipients to internalize the privileged views. 
Opinions differ on the desirability of this phenomenon,14 but everyone from U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices15 to Pink Floyd16 understands intuitively that it happens. 
More importantly, an extensive literature on political socialization has corroborated 
the popular intuition across a range of educational contexts and cultures,17 and stud-
ies in social psychology have identified the underlying causal mechanism as persua-
sion.18 As I will demonstrate, there is reason to believe that this mechanism also op-
erates in international legal education, and that training-induced attitudes about 
international law manifest as individual behaviors of support or disregard for the dis-
cipline once graduates enter their professions. Law schools may thus operate as por-
tals through which attitudes about international norms—whether positive or nega-
tive—diffuse domestically.19 
                                                                                                             
 
 14. See, e.g., IVAN ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY (1971) (critiquing institutionalized 
education). 
 15. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 437 (1993) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Our cases have consistently recognized the importance of edu-
cation to the professional and personal development of the individual.”). 
 16. PINK FLOYD, Another Brick in the Wall (Part II), on THE WALL (Columbia 1979) (“We 
don’t need no education, we don’t need no thought control.”). In the same spirit, see GEORGE 
ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1946), in which a little pig uses education to persuade the other ani-
mals to expel Mr. Jones from Manor Farm and, later, uses it to subjugate them. 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. See infra Part II.B. 
 19. Cf. Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellín, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration 
of International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 760 (2006) (defining norm por-
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The other premise is that graduates persuaded toward support or disregard of 
international law are capable of influencing state action as professionals, especially 
in the aggregate. For example, some will become prosecutors, judges, or foreign 
policy elites with direct control over compliance decisions. Others will join interest 
groups or NGOs that pressure government actors to adopt or reject policies of 
obedience. Some will encounter opportunities to utilize or argue against global norms 
in the course of private practice. And as authoritative expositors of the law in 
domestic media, some will exert influence over public discourse and, in turn, popular 
attitudes about the legitimacy of international law. In summary, legal education can 
spur lawyers to act in conformity with privileged views about international law, and 
these professionals can in turn shape state behavior. On this logic, significant global 
variations in the study of international law generate kaleidoscopic perceptions on the 
contours and normative weight of the field, along with attendant effects on state 
policy. 
The training thesis accepts that the international order is in one sense anarchic 
—the formal equality of functionally undifferentiated sovereign states ensures a 
general absence of legal authority to coerce.20 Indeed, the absence of a supranational 
government with authority to mandate a single curriculum is probably a major 
contributor to the diversity of national approaches to international legal training.21 
But this condition does not dictate any particular view within states about the binding 
character or value of international law. Centralized enforcement is not a sine qua non 
of legal order.22 Insofar as universities play a critical role in shaping how the legal 
profession around the world perceives international law and the profession in turn 
shapes state behavior, these institutions influence compliance. To adapt Alexander 
Wendt’s famous dictum, anarchy is in part what law schools make of it.23  
This argument draws upon sociological institutionalist and constructivist insights 
from an extensive literature on law and international relations theory. Particularly 
germane is the scholarship of Jeffrey Checkel, who traces the process by which trans-
national socialization mechanisms interact with domestic political structures to gen-
erate varying levels of norm compliance.24 Like Checkel’s work, the training thesis 
                                                                                                             
 
tals as “horizontal gateway[s] that allow[], through a formal procedural mechanism or sub-
stantive right, the importation of external norms into a legal system”) (emphasis omitted). 
 20. Cf. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 102–16 (1979) (de-
scribing the conditions of anarchy). 
 21. See generally Ryan M. Scoville, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL 
SURVEY, http://pilmap.org [https://perma.cc/Z498-KSQE] (reporting data on varying rates of 
mandatory training in international law among states). 
 22. See, e.g., Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism: 
Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 19, 
65 (2000) (applying Lon Fuller’s interactional theory to suggest that the status of “law” 
—international law in particular—does not depend on enforcement, but on “rhetorical activity 
producing increasingly influential mutual expectations or shared understandings of actors”). 
 23. See Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391 (1992). 
 24. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Checkel, International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging 
the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide, 3 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 473 (1997) [hereinafter Checkel, 
International Norms and Domestic Politics]; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Why Comply? Social Learn-
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has an eclectic theoretical foundation that draws on multiple disciplines to identify 
the chain of processes that produce compliance decisions.25 The point of departure 
from his and other similar analyses is primarily chronological and venue-based. That 
is, scholars often treat norm entrepreneurs,26 epistemic communities,27 government 
elites,28 and domestic political coalitions as important variables in the compliance 
equation, but either ignore where those actors obtained their attitudes or examine 
socializing influences that arise relatively late in the game, once the key individuals 
have already emerged as established professionals.29 I move the socialization inquiry 
back in time by suggesting that many of the people who exert material influence over 
state behavior obtained enduring orientations in favor of or against international law 
from the university setting. 
Most immediately, the argument suggests a research agenda for scholars. Studies 
on the nature and significance of international legal education have been largely ab-
sent for decades, and this notwithstanding a voluminous literature on norms. By of-
fering a theoretical account of the significance of law schools, the training thesis 
helps to orient and structure future empirical work on the state of international legal 
education around the world, the determinants of cross-national variation and com-
monality, and the consequences of difference. By assembling supportive evidence 
from social psychology and political science, I hope to show that further study will 
be worth the effort. 
If true, the training thesis also carries practical implications for scholars, univer-
sities, and policymakers. It would help to explain why violations of international law 
occur, why some states appear to adhere to their obligations more than others, and 
why states at times hold fundamentally different views about international norms. It 
would mean that the place of international law in the curriculum, and the particular 
way in which professors go about teaching the subject, are compliance issues. More 
concretely, it would support conclusions about specific states. For example, mapping 
                                                                                                             
 
ing and European Identity Change, 55 INT’L ORG. 553 (2001) [hereinafter Checkel, Why Com-
ply?]; see also Thomas Risse-Kappen, Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, 
Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War, 48 INT’L ORG. 185 (1994) (proposing a 
similar framework). 
 25. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Intro-
duction and Framework, 59 INT’L ORG. 801 (2005). 
 26. See, e.g., Amy Gurowitz, Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immi-
grants, and the Japanese State, 51 WORLD POL. 413 (1999). 
 27. See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International 
Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1 (1992); Frans van Waarden & Michaela Drahos, Courts 
and (Epistemic) Communities in the Convergence of Competition Policies, 9 J. EUR. PUB. 
POL’Y 913 (2002). 
 28. See, e.g., Richard Herrmann, The Power of Perceptions in Foreign-Policy Decision 
Making: Do Views of the Soviet Union Determine the Policy Choices of American Leaders?, 
30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 841, 843 (1986). 
 29. Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process, for example, holds that interna-
tional norms infiltrate domestic society when transnational agents interact to resolve contested 
norms in law-declaring fora. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2645–58 (1997). I accept this view, but think it incomplete insofar 
as it overlooks the possibility that the classroom is also an important “transmission belt” 
through which norms infiltrate the domestic context. 
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the theoretical argument onto the global survey data would suggest that the operative 
systems of legal education in states like Austria and Sweden, where international law 
training is pervasive and rigorous,30 materially contribute to compliance while the 
systems of places like the United States and Pakistan, where such training is respec-
tively uncommon and poor in quality, carry neutral or opposite effects.31 The argu-
ment would also suggest that states such as Belize and The Bahamas, which by agree-
ment share a common system of legal education with other Caribbean nations,32 are 
on balance more likely to act on the basis of compatible views about international 
law in the course of executing their foreign policies. Finally, for law faculties and 
national and international policymakers, confirmation of the training thesis would 
establish that decisions about legal training requirements carry significant foreign 
policy consequences over the long run.  
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I substantiates the claim that there are 
significant global disparities in the study of international law. The Part conducts a 
survey of thousands of universities in over 190 countries, reveals new data on cross-
national variations in the extent to which individuals must study public international 
law prior to completing a law degree, and then discusses accompanying differences 
in educational quality, topical emphases, and ideological orientation. PILMap.org, a 
website developed to accompany the Article, reports some of the findings in the form 
                                                                                                             
 
 30. See Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Austria, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A 
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/AT [https://perma.cc/TVL7-ELXV] (reporting 
evidence that Austrian law requires domestic law schools to make public international law a 
mandatory part of their curricula); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Sweden, WHO STUDIES 
INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/SE [https://perma.cc 
/WMG4-D4R8] (reporting that all Swedish law schools require students to complete a course 
on public international law). 
 31. AHMED ALI KHAN, LEGAL EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN: A REVIEW 1, http://www 
.supremecourt.gov.pk/ijc/articles/6/1.pdf [https://perma.cc/58D3-VDBY] (“Legal Education 
in Pakistan is in a colossal mess at all levels.”); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: United States, 
WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/US 
[https://perma.cc/YK9W-SDAB] (reporting that only approximately four percent of U.S. law 
schools require a course concerning public international law). 
 32. See Agreement Establishing the Council of Legal Education (1970), CARIBBEAN 
COMMUNITY SECRETARIAT (1970), http://archive.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments 
/agreement_cle.jsp?menu=secretariat [https://perma.cc/GS9Q-9SFY]. The Agreement pro-
vides that any LLB graduates of the University of the West Indies, and any Guyanese nationals 
who are LLB graduates from the University of Guyana, are entitled to automatic admission to 
any of three regional law schools—Norman Manley Law School in Jamaica, Hugh Wooding 
Law School in Trinidad and Tobago, and Eugene Dupuch Law School in The Bahamas. See 
id. at Art. 3. Graduates from these schools are in turn qualified to practice law in jurisdictions 
throughout the Caribbean. Id. at Art. 4–5. Several states in the South Pacific have created a 
similar arrangement. See Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Fiji, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL 
LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/FJ [https://perma.cc/ALY8-TXBN] (Fiji); 
Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Papua New Guinea, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A 
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/PG [https://perma.cc/6A6X-7GHH] (Papua New 
Guinea); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Solomon Islands, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/SB [https://perma.cc/HA3P-63JS] (Solomon 
Islands); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Vanuatu, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A 
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/VU [https://perma.cc/5HZQ-L556] (Vanuatu).  
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of an interactive world map.33 This evidence distinguishes the study of international 
law from the study of municipal law, which tends to be highly homogeneous within 
the jurisdiction to which it pertains.  
The rest of the Article elaborates on the processes by which the global disparities 
identified in Part I might translate into state behavior. Part II justifies the view that 
legal education can mold its recipients. Using experimental evidence from social 
psychology, I contend that training in international law is capable of persuading stu-
dents to view the discipline in ways that law faculties have chosen to privilege, the 
result of which is classes of graduates who are likely to act in support or disregard of 
international norms as professionals, depending on the nature of the instruction they 
received. Part III in turn justifies the view that these professionals can be sufficiently 
influential to align state policy with classroom orthodoxy. Using a diverse set of 
scholarship from political science, I argue that individuals with legal training are 
often well positioned to shape state behavior as government elites, activists, private 
practitioners, and experts, but also that national political structures are likely to me-
diate the types of professionals who will matter most. Part IV expounds upon the 
thesis’s merits and implications. 
To be clear, my purpose is primarily descriptive rather than normative. I assume 
that effective international law is desirable, but that assumption is not necessary to 
the argument. Thus, for readers who hold different normative priors, the training the-
sis is still significant; all that changes are the implications.  
I. GLOBAL VARIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EDUCATION 
Contemporary doctrine holds that international law is universal—it generally ap-
plies in the same way across the entire globe, regardless of culture, nationality, and 
history.34 The study of the discipline, however, is highly variegated in the sense that 
there are wide cross-national variations in the pervasiveness, quality, topical empha-
ses, and ideological orientation of university instruction. This Part reveals these dif-
ferences by conducting the most extensive global survey on the study of international 
law to date, and by highlighting relevant research from the fields of comparative 
international law and law and development. 
A. Pervasiveness 
To identify global study patterns, I conducted a survey in 2014 on the frequency 
with which law schools and governments around the world require law students to 
complete a course on public international law.35 To collect the data, I relied on a 
combination of official government documents, information available on the 
websites of thousands of university law faculties, and, occasionally, email 
                                                                                                             
 
 33. Scoville, supra note 21. 
 34. Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of 
Imposition and Appropriation, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 475 (2010).  
 35. By “law degree,” I mean the principal university degree that students complete prior 
to entering legal practice. In many countries, this is an LLB or a JD. The definition excludes 
LLMs, PhDs, and non-law undergraduate degrees that may be prerequisites to enrollment in a 
JD or JD-equivalent program.  
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correspondence with faculty members. Where this evidence established that a 
curriculum includes a mandatory course on “public international law,” “international 
law,” “international human rights law,” or any other topic that on its face 
substantially implicates public international law,36 I coded the corresponding 
university as requiring international legal training. Inversely, I coded a university as 
requiring no such training where the evidence demonstrated that courses on public 
international law are elective or unavailable. Finally, I coded a university as “no data” 
if it has a law faculty but evidence of its curriculum was inaccessible within the 
confines of the research methods. The results are available at PILMap.org in the form 
of an interactive map that allows users to examine summary statistics and details 
about the curricula of specific law schools within each national jurisdiction.37 
Assuming that 2014 is generally representative of prior and subsequent years, the 
survey results are noteworthy in several respects. First, they illuminate the minimum 
amount of training that occurs among law students in a majority of states. They es-
tablish, for example, that at least one-third of law students in Australia take a course 
on international law, and that at least four percent of American students do so, along 
with at least forty percent of Saudi students and all Indian students.38 The emphasis 
here is on minimum levels of training because the survey does not take into account 
elective courses or those completed for advanced law degrees, such as LLMs and 
JSDs. In countries where relevant electives or additional degrees are popular, the 
actual percentage of students who have completed some form of international law 
course will likely hover well above the reported percentage.39 This fact limits the 
data’s usefulness for comparisons of states with similar compulsory training rates, 
but still permits comparisons between the poles. For instance, given a compulsory 
training rate of 100% in Brazil and 0% in Japan, it is likely that Brazilian law students 
study international law at a much higher rate than their Japanese counterparts.40  
Second, the survey establishes that compulsory education in international law is 
widespread, but also far from universal. It is common on all continents, particularly 
                                                                                                             
 
 36. For example, I did not count evidence of a required course on private international 
law, the law of the European Union, or comparative law. I did, however, count “transnational 
law” courses that incorporate public international law.  
 37. Scoville, supra note 21.  
 38. See Scoville, supra note 21 (reporting national percentages). 
 39. From conversations with colleagues who are knowledgeable about international law 
teaching in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, I have the sense that interna-
tional law is a more popular elective in those countries than it has been in the United States. 
Cf. John A. Barrett, Jr., International Legal Education in U.S. Law Schools: Plenty of Offer-
ings, But Too Few Students, 31 INT’L LAW. 845, 854 (1997) (suggesting that student enroll-
ment in international law courses has been low for decades); Charlotte Ku & Christopher J. 
Borgen, American Lawyers and International Competence, 18 DICKINSON J. INT’L L. 493, 
502–03 (2000) (describing how enrollment rates in international law courses in the United 
States have historically been low). 
 40. Compare Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Brazil, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A 
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/BR [https://perma.cc/QSG9-M5EY] (reporting 
that all Brazilian law schools require a course on public international law), with Ryan M. 
Scoville, Country: Japan, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, 
http://pilmap.org/Details/JP [https://perma.cc/LK7Z-UXCZ] (reporting that no Japanese law 
schools require a course on the subject). 
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Africa, Asia, and South America.41 In this sense, it is not a peculiarity of the 
European lawyer, as the stereotype seems to hold, but standard for a majority of law 
graduates around the world. Indeed, there are many states in which every single law 
student must take at least one international law course.42 Table 1 aggregates these 
results by reporting the percentage of law schools on each continent that mandate 
training on public international law. Table 2 in turn shows the average rate of com-
pulsory training among states on each continent. The results recall earlier research 
by world society theorists, who have found cross-national similarities in a host of 
organizational domains, including education,43 and Duncan Kennedy’s work on the 
globalization of legal thought.44 
Features of the survey methodology suggest that the results are, if anything, likely 
to understate the amount of training that is taking place. One reason is that the map 
codes universities as not requiring international legal education if they offer multiple 
forms of a basic law degree and even just one of those forms omits a compulsory 
international course.45 Another is that the map does not account for electives, or for 
training that professors might incorporate into courses with titles that appear 
unrelated to the topic. Still another reason is that the map numbers do not reflect 
sources of non-university training, such as bar examinations and post-graduate 
programs for future judges and prosecutors, which appear to be fairly common. In 
Europe, for example, the bar exams of Albania, Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
                                                                                                             
 
 41. See Ryan M. Scoville, Continental Map of Africa, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL 
LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/ContinentalMaps?map=africa_en [https://perma 
.cc/P4V5-XF36] (Africa); Ryan M. Scoville, Continental Map of South America, WHO 
STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/ContinentalMaps?map 
=south_america_en [https://perma.cc/6D9F-J8TF] (South America). 
 42. See, e.g., Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Brazil, supra note 40; Ryan M. Scoville, 
Country: Ethiopia, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org 
/Details/ET [https://perma.cc/4T3D-RFZV] (Ethiopia); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: India, 
WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/IN [https:// 
perma.cc/Y5MV-BFHE] (India). 
 43. See, e.g., DAVID JOHN FRANK & JAY GABLER, RECONSTRUCTING THE UNIVERSITY: 
WORLDWIDE SHIFTS IN ACADEMIA IN THE 20TH CENTURY (2006) (reporting cross-national simi-
larities in university curricula across a range of disciplines); John W. Meyer, Francisco O. 
Ramirez & Yasemin Nuhoḡlu Soysal, World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870–1980, 65 
SOC. EDUC. 128 (1992) (discussing evidence of global isomorphism in the provision of mass 
schooling).  
 44. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek 
& Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
 45. This was an issue for some law schools in countries with mixed legal traditions, like 
Canada and Saudi Arabia. In Canada, the use of civil law in Quebec and common law else-
where has led some schools to offer separate degrees for civil and common law practitioners. 
In these cases, it is typical for only the civil law degree to include a mandatory course on 
international law. Universities in Saudi Arabia have dealt with the coexistence of secular and 
Sharia law in similar fashion by requiring study in international law only for secular degree 
candidates. Because it is possible for law students at these universities to avoid international 
law by opting for a common or Sharia law degree, I coded the institutions as not requiring 
international legal training.  
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     Table 1. Aggregate compulsory training rates46 
Continent Aggregate Rate 
Africa 88% 
Asia 92% 
Europe 70% 
North America 43% 
Oceania 30% 
South America 99% 
 
      Table 2. Average compulsory training rates 
Continent Average Rate 
Africa 84% 
Asia 82% 
Europe 85% 
North America 90% 
Oceania 11% 
South America 99% 
 
Finland, France, and Lithuania, among others, all covered international law in 
2014,47 while countries such as Albania and the Czech Republic also incorporated 
international law into specialized judicial training.48  
Combined with population statistics from the World Bank49 and UNESCO data 
on the annual number of university graduates in law from an assortment of national 
jurisdictions,50 the PILMap.org results also make it possible to develop a baseline 
measure of international legal norm diffusion. Specifically, multiplying the number 
of law graduates for a given country and year by the corresponding rate of compul-
sory training in international law, and then dividing by the country’s total population 
for that year reveals the minimum number of new law graduates per capita who have 
                                                                                                             
 
 46. The numbers for Tables 1 and 2 were calculated based on the curricular information 
reported at PILMap.org. See Scoville, supra note 21.  
 47. See Ryan M. Scoville, Continental Map of Europe, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL 
LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/ContinentalMaps?map=europe_en [https://perma 
.cc/C9LL-3LXH] (data on European states). 
 48. See, e.g., Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Albania, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/AL [https://perma.cc/2X96-X55F] (Albania); 
Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Czech Republic, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL 
SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/CZ [https://perma.cc/D7Z8-FMBY] (Czech Republic). 
 49. Data: Population, Total, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP 
.POP.TOTL [https://perma.cc/4AVG-LHTS]. 
 50. UNESCO Inst. for Statistics, Tertiary-Level Enrollment in Law Programmes and the 
Number of Tertiary-Level Graduates from Law Programmes by Country, 2009–2013 (Feb. 
19, 2016) (unpublished spreadsheet on file with the Indiana Law Journal). I obtained this data 
through email correspondence with a researcher at the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. E-mail 
from Chiao-Ling Chien, Researcher, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, to Ryan M. Scoville, 
Assoc. Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (Feb. 19, 2016, 11:03 AM) (e-mail on 
file with the Indiana Law Journal).   
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completed at least one course on public international law. The results of this calcu-
lation suggest extreme variation in the pervasiveness of international legal 
knowledge among national populations. In 2012 in Lithuania, for example, slightly 
over 3100 individuals graduated with a law degree, and all of them appear to have 
completed at least one course on public international law.51 Given a national popula-
tion of approximately 2.9 million,52 3100 people is equivalent to approximately one 
new graduate with international legal training for every thousand Lithuanian resi-
dents. In the same year in Ghana, by contrast, the number was five hundred times 
smaller at approximately one in five hundred thousand. Table 3 reports these data for 
2012 for a select number of countries.53 
Table 3. Number of 2012 graduates in law who completed at least one compulsory course on 
public international law  
Country 
Number of Graduates 
(Per Pop. of 500,000) 
Country 
Number of Graduates 
(Per Pop. of 500,000) 
Lithuania 522 Austria 130 
Estonia 260 Bulgaria 120 
Brazil 242 Sweden 108 
Croatia 231 Greece 104 
Denmark 192 Finland 99 
Colombia 187 Norway 97 
Iran 170 Guyana 29 
Luxembourg 167 Lesotho 9 
Tunisia 160 Qatar 7 
Czech Republic 151 United States 4 
Belgium 132 Ghana 1 
Viewed in light of prior research, the PILMap.org results also suggest a trajectory 
in global practice. In 1967 and 1973, René-Jean Dupuy and his coauthors published 
surveys of training requirements across a selection of states, including on the extent 
to which international law is a compulsory subject of study.54 Table 4 compares the 
results of those surveys with my own.  
                                                                                                             
 
 51. UNESCO Inst. For Statistics, supra note 50.   
 52. Data: Population, Total, supra note 49. 
 53. The table focuses on 2012 because that is the most recent year for which the UNESCO 
data is available, and reports only those countries for which there was both UNESCO and 
PILMap.org data. Importantly, for the minority of Table 3 countries whose compulsory train-
ing rates fell somewhere between 0% and 100% (Belgium, Ghana, and the United States), the 
accuracy of the data assumes that the graduating classes were roughly the same size across 
different universities—an assumption that may not hold true. The data also assume that com-
pulsory training rates did not change materially from 2012 to the date of the PILMap.org sur-
vey in 2014. 
 54. RENÉ-JEAN DUPUY, THE UNIVERSITY TEACHING OF SOCIAL SCIENCES: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1967); RENÉ JEAN DUPUY & GREGORY TUNKIN, COMPARABILITY OF DEGREES AND DIPLO-
MAS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY ON THE STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS (1973). 
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Table 4. Compulsory training in international law: Historical comparison of national 
percentages 
Country 1967 1973 2014 
Bulgaria — 100% 100% 
Denmark 0% 0% 100% 
Egypt 100% 100% 100%55 
Finland 100% 100% 100% 
France56 100% 100% 54% 
West Germany — 0% 47% (Germany) 
Hungary 100% 100% 100% 
India ~50% ~50% 99% 
Italy 100% 100% ³95% 
Japan 0% 0% 0% 
“Latin America”57 100% 100% 99%58 
Nigeria 0% 0% 0%59 
Norway 0% 0% 100% 
Romania — 100% ³74% 
Sri Lanka — 0% ³50% 
Sweden 0% 0% 100% 
UK60 48% — 3% 
USA “Very few” “Very few” 4% 
USSR 100% 100% 100% (Russia) 
Yugoslavia 100% 100% ³77% (successor states) 
 
                                                                                                             
 
 55. This figure is tentative. All Egyptian universities that published their training require-
ments reported that students must take a course on international law, but such reports were not 
always available.  
 56. French universities first introduced international law as a compulsory subject in 1889. 
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960, at 31 (2001). “The situation was not very different in other 
continental States.” Id. 
 57. The prior surveys did not identify the specific Latin American countries they included.  
 58. This figure is tentative because curricular information is not available for a handful of 
universities in Latin America. 
 59. This figure is also tentative, given the limited availability of curricular information 
for some universities in Nigeria.  
 60. In England, the “first chairs of international law proper were set up . . . in Oxford in 
1859 . . . and in Cambridge in 1866,” but it does not appear that any international law courses 
at these universities were compulsory during this early period. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 56, 
at 33; see also MANFRED LACHS, THE TEACHER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHINGS AND 
TEACHING 165–66 (2d rev. ed. 1987) (explaining that even by the late 1800s, international law 
was “not taught at a considerable number of European universities,” and that even where the 
subject was taught, the “number of courses was very modest (one in general, during one se-
mester, for a few hours per week)”). 
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The comparison shows that most of the significant change in the surveyed states 
has been in the direction of more international legal training. Law schools in 
Scandinavian states did not require their students to study international law in the 
1960s and 1970s, but do so now. Only 50% of Indian law schools mandated an in-
ternational course up through 1973, but nearly 100% have the requirement today. 
Germany and Sri Lanka appear to have experienced shifts of similar magnitude.  
The notion of a global trend toward international training is consistent with a more 
recent survey by John King Gamble, who in the early 1990s collected responses to 
questionnaires that he sent to “members of the American Society of International 
Law living outside the U.S. and Canada who had indicated in the Society’s member-
ship records that a major portion of their work involved the teaching of international 
law.”61 With responses from 150 professors in thirty different countries, most of 
which were European, Gamble reported that “an introductory course in public inter-
national law [was] required for the first law degree” at 66% of universities.62 While 
methodological differences63 between our surveys preclude any firm conclusions, it 
appears, based on the available data, that compulsory study rates have increased since 
the date of Gamble’s survey. As reported in Table 2,64 the PILMap.org data show not 
only that the aggregate rate of compulsory training is now 70% in Europe, but also 
that rates are even higher on a majority of the other continents.  
Even in countries where international law is typically an elective, there is evi-
dence of a significant expansion in the number and variety of international course 
offerings since the mid-twentieth century. Consider the United States: A survey from 
1907 found that while ten schools—Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Cornell, Chicago, 
Indiana, Iowa, George Washington, John Marshall, and Washington University 
—offered an elective, “[m]any of the lesser schools and most of the Western schools 
omit[ted] international law.”65 This state of affairs persisted for quite some time. 
Manley Hudson complained in 1929 that law schools had “neglect[ed] the subject” 
for the past “several decades,”66 and in 1938 only 22 of 84 Association of American 
Law Schools (AALS) member schools offered even one course on the subject.67 But 
                                                                                                             
 
 61. JOHN KING GAMBLE, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 1990S, at 68 (1993).  
 62. Id. at 68, 77–78. 
 63. The present survey differs from Gamble’s in several respects, aside from its date. 
First, it is more global in the sense that it includes data on almost all states. Second, it does not 
focus exclusively on whether foreign educational institutions require courses on public inter-
national law; it also reflects whether foreign law requires such courses. And third, the present 
survey relies on different research methods. Rather than depend on responses to question-
naires, I tapped virtually every source I could imagine, with a particular emphasis on the cur-
ricular materials that are available on law school websites. 
 64. See supra text accompanying notes 43–46. 
 65. Charles Noble Gregory, The Study of International Law in Law Schools, 2 AM. L. 
SCH. REV. 41, 45 (1907); see also John M. Raymond & Barbara J. Frischholz, Lawyers Who 
Established International Law in the United States, 1776–1914, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 802, 
815–17 (1982) (discussing the introduction of international law into American legal education 
in the nineteenth century). 
 66. Manley O. Hudson, The Teaching of International Law in America, 15 A.B.A. J. 19, 
22 (1929). 
 67. Manley O. Hudson, Twelve Casebooks on International Law, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 447, 
456 (1938). 
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international electives expanded steadily after World War II. By 1947, the number 
of schools with an elective in international law had increased to 30.68 That number 
soon grew to 55, or 51% of AALS member schools, by 1953;69 91, or 68% of schools, 
by 1964;70 and 117, or 78% of schools, by 1974.71 At this point, moreover, it was not 
uncommon to see multiple offerings—32% of schools had three or more electives in 
international legal studies by the mid-1960s.72 Reported contributors to this shift in-
clude the publication of new teaching materials, an increase in the number of law 
professors who were qualified to teach the subject, financial support from the Ford 
Foundation, and a growing student belief in the utility of international training.73 
The postwar trend continued into more recent decades. By 1991, John King 
Gamble was able to report that 98% of American schools offered at least one course 
on international law.74 By 1997, roughly 90% had 5 or more international offerings.75 
A 2004 American Bar Association (ABA) survey documented a “noted increase[]” 
in international electives during the 1990s, with 33 schools now making available not 
only an introductory course, but specialization certificates as well.76 
Although it is uncertain whether the United Nations played a role, the expansion 
of international legal education over the second half of the twentieth century occurred 
alongside a litany of supportive resolutions from the UN General Assembly. In the 
first of these, adopted in 1947, the General Assembly resolved “to request the 
Governments of Member States . . . [t]o take appropriate measures to extend the 
teaching of international law in all its phases . . . in the universities and higher edu-
cational institutions of each country that are under government control . . . or to ini-
tiate such teaching where it is not yet provided.”77 Subsequent resolutions reaffirmed 
this request with more forceful language: The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights proclaimed as one of its core purposes that “every individual and every organ 
                                                                                                             
 
 68. Philip W. Thayer, The Teaching of International and Comparative Law, 1 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 449, 449 (1949). 
 69. Wm. W. Bishop, Jr., International Law in American Law Schools Today, 47 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 686, 687 (1953). 
 70. RICHARD W. EDWARDS, JR., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES: A SURVEY OF TEACHING 
IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 1963–1964, at 3, 32 (1965).  
 71. MICHAEL H. CARDOZO, THE PRACTICAL STATE OF TEACHING AND RESEARCH IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1974, at 29, 42 (1977). The utility of comparing these surveys assumes 
that they employed identical or at least similar methodologies. 
 72. See EDWARDS, supra note 70, at 3, 5. 
 73. See, e.g., id. at 11, 34 (discussing growing student and faculty interest in international 
law); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford 
Foundation, and the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 447, 
450 (2004) (discussing the role of the Ford Foundation).  
 74. GAMBLE, supra note 61, at 121.  
 75. John A. Barrett, Jr., International Legal Education in the United States: Being Edu-
cated for Domestic Practice While Living in a Global Society, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
975, 992 (1997).  
 76. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, A SURVEY OF 
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA: 1992–2002, at 7, 32 (2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content 
/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/1992_2002_survey_of_law_school_curricula 
.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LDU-U6YU]. 
 77. G.A. Res. 176 (II), ¶ 1 (Nov. 21, 1947). 
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of society . . . shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect” for its enu-
merated rights and freedoms.78 In 1962, the General Assembly “[u]rge[d] Member 
States to undertake broad programmes of training . . . in the field of international 
law.”79 From 1970 to 1990, a string of ten resolutions repeatedly “[u]rge[d] all 
Governments to encourage the inclusion of courses on international law in the pro-
grammes of legal studies offered at institutions of higher learning.”80 In 1989, the 
General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring the 1990s the “United Nations 
Decade of International Law,” one of the primary goals of which was to “encourage 
the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law.”81 
Subsequent resolutions from 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999 “[u]rge[d] all 
States . . . to make all possible efforts to implement th[is] goal[],”82 and a resolution 
from 1992 invited states to “encourage their educational institutions to introduce 
courses in international law for students studying law, political science, social sci-
ences and other relevant disciplines.”83  
The postwar expansion also occurred alongside the adoption of a handful of multi-
lateral treaties that explicitly call upon states to educate national publics on treaty 
norms, particularly in the areas of human rights law and international humanitarian 
law. Parties to the Geneva Conventions, for instance, “undertake . . . to disseminate 
the text of [the Conventions] as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, 
in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if pos-
sible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire 
population.”84 Likewise, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights imposes 
on state parties “the duty to promote and ensure through teaching, education and 
publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the [Charter] and to 
see to it that these freedoms and rights as well as corresponding obligations and 
duties are understood.”85 Comparable provisions are also present in the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,86 the 
                                                                                                             
 
 78. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 72 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 79. G.A. Res. 1816 (XVII), ¶ 1 (Dec. 18, 1962). 
 80. G.A. Res. 44/28, ¶ 9 (Dec. 4, 1989); G.A. Res. 42/148, ¶ 9 (Dec. 7, 1987); G.A. Res. 
40/66, ¶ 8 (Dec. 11, 1985); G.A. Res. 38/129, ¶ 8 (Dec. 19, 1983); G.A. Res. 36/108, ¶ 8 (Dec. 
10, 1981); G.A. Res. 34/144, ¶ 8 (Dec. 17, 1979); G.A. Res. 32/146, ¶ 6 (Dec. 16, 1977); G.A. 
Res. 3502 (XXX), ¶ 6 (Dec. 15, 1975); G.A. Res. 3106 (XXVIII), ¶ 5 (Dec. 12, 1973); G.A. 
Res. 2838 (XXVI), ¶ 6 (Dec. 18, 1971).  
 81. G.A. Res. 44/23, ¶¶ 1–2 (Nov. 17, 1989).  
 82. G.A. Res. 54/102, ¶ 12 (Dec. 9, 1999); G.A. Res. 52/152, ¶ 13 (Dec. 15, 1997); G.A. 
Res. 50/43, ¶ 12 (Dec. 11, 1995); G.A. Res. 48/29, ¶ 13 (Dec. 9, 1993); G.A. Res. 46/50, ¶ 13 
(Dec. 9, 1991).  
 83. G.A. Res. 47/32, annex ¶ IV(2) (Nov. 25, 1992).  
 84. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. 
 85. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 25, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58. 
 86. G.A. Res. 61/177, annex, International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, art. 23(1) (Dec. 20, 2006) (“Each State Party shall ensure that 
the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials 
and other persons who may be involved in the custody or treatment of any person deprived of 
liberty includes the necessary education and information regarding the relevant provisions of 
this Convention . . . .”). 
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Convention Against Torture,87 and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions,88 among various other treaties. These agreements impose obligations 
on states rather than universities, but may have spurred some governments to include 
international law as a compulsory subject of study in municipal laws that regulate 
the content of legal training. By helping to normalize the idea of international legal 
education, the agreements may have also inspired some universities to mandate per-
tinent courses on their own initiative.  
But even given the historical trend, the survey data show that training in interna-
tional law remains far from universal. Some states that suffer from severe poverty 
and instability, such as the Central African Republic and South Sudan, do not appear 
to have functioning law schools, much less compulsory training on international 
norms.89 As Table 5 illustrates, law schools in developed states, such as Ireland, 
Japan, and New Zealand, have chosen categorically not to require the study of inter-
national law.90 And in places like Australia, Canada, Ghana, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, mandatory training is not the majority practice.91 It is reason-
able to assume comparatively low levels of exposure among graduates in these states. 
Moreover, the percentage of university faculty members who work in the discipline 
of law declined globally by roughly one-third over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury, from 5.7% to 3.9%.92 This development raises the possibility that fewer univer-
sity students now study international law, even if compulsory study has become more 
common among those who do.  
                                                                                                             
 
 87. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 10(1), adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85. 
 88. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 83(1), adopted June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (“The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of 
armed conflict, to disseminate the Conventions and this Protocol as widely as possible in their 
respective countries and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of 
military instruction and to encourage the study thereof by the civilian population, so that those 
instruments may become known to the armed forces and to the civilian population.”). 
 89. See Scoville, Continental Map of Africa, supra note 41 (data on African states). 
 90. See Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Ireland, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A 
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/IE [https://perma.cc/T2FK-ATNV] (Ireland); 
Scoville, Country: Japan, supra note 40 (Japan); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: New Zealand, 
WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/NZ 
[https://perma.cc/5WUH-ZUNV] (New Zealand). 
 91. See Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Australia, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A 
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/AU [https://perma.cc/B7S4-XBC3] (Australia); 
Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Canada, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, 
http://pilmap.org/Details/CA [https://perma.cc/FZN5-F6P9] (Canada); Ryan M. Scoville, 
Country: United Kingdom, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, 
http://pilmap.org/Details/GB [https://perma.cc/7C7S-JA2G] (United Kingdom); Scoville, 
supra note 31 (United States). 
 92. FRANK & GABLER, supra note 43, at 68–69. 
1466 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:1449 
 
Table 5. Lowest rates of compulsory study93 
Country National Rate  
Ireland 0% 
Japan 0% 
New Zealand 0% 
Nigeria 0% 
Papua New Guinea 0% 
United Kingdom 3% 
South Korea 4% 
United States 4% 
Canada 23% 
Ghana 25% 
Finally, the map data raise questions about the etiological roots of cross-national 
variation. Part of the explanation appears to lie in domestic law. To the extent that 
there are rates of 100%, it is typically where a national government has adopted a 
statute or regulation that obligates universities to teach international law as a manda-
tory course. This is the case in a number of major jurisdictions, including Brazil, 
India, Pakistan, and Russia,94 although China has achieved a similarly high rate under 
a law that merely recommends for the course to be mandatory.95 In contrast, rates 
tend to be much lower in states where national regulation is absent.96  
Differences in legal tradition might also play a role. Of the ten states with the 
lowest rates of compulsory training, eight are common law jurisdictions.97 The cor-
relation is not perfect—India, for example, mandates instruction98—but civil law ju-
risdictions appear more inclined to compel international training. The deeper ques-
tions of why only some states see the discipline as sufficiently important to include 
in their national or subnational requirements, and why common law jurisdictions of-
ten choose not to prioritize international legal education, present intriguing avenues 
for future research.  
B. Quality 
The study of international law also varies globally in the sense that there are vast 
domestic and cross-national disparities in quality of instruction. On one end of the 
                                                                                                             
 
 93. I calculated these percentages based on the curricular data I reported at PILMap.org. 
See Scoville, supra note 21.  
 94. See Scoville, Country: Brazil, supra note 40 (Brazil); Scoville, Country: India, supra 
note 42 (India); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Pakistan, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A 
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/PK [https://perma.cc/8YSJ-5VFC] (Pakistan); 
Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Russia, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, 
http://pilmap.org/Details/RU [https://perma.cc/2V7A-BDW7] (Russia).  
 95. See Ryan M. Scoville, Country: China, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A 
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/CN [https://perma.cc/C298-URH7]. 
 96. See, e.g., Scoville, supra note 31 (reporting a compulsory training rate of 4% in the 
United States, which does not have national curriculum requirements). 
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 55–60 (Table 4). 
 98. Scoville, Country: India, supra note 42.  
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continuum are the usual elite suspects—the top schools in Europe, the United States, 
and a few other places—that draw on vast financial resources, enjoy immensely 
qualified faculties, use rigorous training techniques, and otherwise promote cultures 
of scholarship and careful study. On the other end are a significant number of schools 
in the developing world, some of which do not have substantial library collections, 
functional facilities, full-time instructors, or casebooks in native languages.99 An en-
tire genre of research and practice in law and development assumes that these condi-
tions materially influence the rule of law at the national level.100 As I demonstrate 
below, the training thesis lays bare the causal mechanics behind that assumption and 
adapts them for an argument about the international rule of law.  
C. Emphasis and Ideological Orientation 
Finally, the study of international law is globally polymorphic in the sense that 
there appears to be significant cross-national variation in the topics that courses tend 
to emphasize and the ideological orientation with which instructors approach them. 
Forthcoming research by Anthea Roberts reveals material differences among the ma-
jor textbooks used in powerful states.101 While Russian textbooks often devote as 
much attention to the law of outer space as they do to the law of international trade, 
most American and British texts barely even mention the subject.102 Some of the 
major Chinese offerings do not include any chapters on human rights.103 U.S. 
                                                                                                             
 
 99. See, e.g., RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM 
INDEX FOR ARMENIA 2–3 (2007) (identifying some of these problems as common in Armenian 
law schools); RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM INDEX 
FOR MEXICO 2–3 (2011) (Mexico); Thomas F. Geraghty & Emmanuel K. Quansah, African 
Legal Education: A Missed Opportunity and Suggestions for Change: A Call for Renewed 
Attention to a Neglected Means of Securing Human Rights and Legal Predictability, 5 LOY. 
U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 87, 90 (2007) (a number of African countries); Hikmahanto Juwana, 
Legal Education Reform in Indonesia, 1 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 6 (Indonesia); C. Raj Kumar, 
Legal Education, Globalization, and Institutional Excellence: Challenges for the Rule of Law 
and Access to Justice in India, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 221, 235 (2013) (India); Bui 
Thi Bich Lien, Legal Education in Transitional Vietnam, in ASIAN SOCIALISM & LEGAL 
CHANGE: THE DYNAMICS OF VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE REFORM 135 (John Gillespie & Pip 
Nicholson eds., 2005) (Vietnam); Carl F. Minzner, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Legal 
Education, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 335, 354–55 (2013) (China); Stephen A. Rosenbaum, The 
Legal Clinic Is More Than a Sign on the Door: Transforming Law School Education in 
Revolutionary Egypt, 5 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 39, 56–58 (2012) (Egypt). For a 
general discussion of these issues, see Philip G. Altbach, Centers and Peripheries in the 
Academic Profession: The Special Challenges of Developing Countries, in THE DECLINE OF 
THE GURU: THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION IN DEVELOPING AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 1 
(Philip G. Altbach ed., 2003). 
 100. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND 
DEVELOPMENT: CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF PROGRESS 279–306 (2008). 
 101. ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL?: A STUDY IN THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND SCHOLARSHIP (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 
80–152) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal). 
 102. Id. (manuscript at 121, 127). 
 103. See id. (manuscript at 122). 
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casebooks cite to domestic law at a uniquely high rate.104 And depending on their 
country of origin, casebooks appear to adopt different presentational strategies and 
espouse divergent views on matters of doctrine. For instance, Chinese and Russian 
textbooks tend to focus on the theory of international law, while Western texts 
generally use case studies to emphasize practice and application.105 Chinese and 
Russian texts also tend to be more critical of humanitarian intervention,106 and even 
among Western sources there are dissimilar analytical frameworks for dealing with 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.107  
Other differences also seem likely. It would not be surprising, for example, if 
third-world approaches to international law108 exert more substantial influence over 
curricula in lesser-developed countries than in places like France and Japan, or if 
Sharia law influences the content of education at universities in the Muslim world, 
some of which offer both Sharia and secular degrees.109 Likewise, communism seems 
to shape training in places like Vietnam, where curricula include mandatory courses 
such as The Thought of Ho Chi Minh, Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism, and 
The Bourgeois Constitution.110 
Researchers have also started to provide evidence of cross-national variation in 
the educational and professional backgrounds of international law professors. 
Roberts, for example, shows that academics in the United Kingdom are far more 
likely to have studied their discipline at a foreign university than their counterparts 
in Russia.111 Australian and British professors tend to publish more frequently in 
journals with international editorial boards.112 And among scholars who reside and 
teach within the global core, Russians and Americans are the most likely to have 
entered the academy after working for their respective national governments.113 
Americans also tend to have relatively little experience studying or practicing law 
abroad, particularly outside of the West.114  The result is that there is not a single, 
                                                                                                             
 
 104. See id. (manuscript at 85).  
 105. Id. (manuscript at 86). 
 106. See id. (manuscript at 141–49). 
 107. See id. (manuscript at 149–52). 
 108. Cf. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE THIRD WORLD: RESHAPING JUSTICE (Richard Falk, 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal & Jacqueline Stevens eds., 2008) (collecting essays that “critically 
explor[e] the past, present and future relevance of international law to the priorities of the 
countries, peoples and regions of the . . . South”). 
 109. Compare, e.g., A Summary of the Study Plan for Undergraduate Department: Sharia, 
JAZAN UNIVERSITY, https://ryanscoville.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/shariah-degree-curriculum 
-jazan-university.pdf [https://perma.cc/G49R-E5ST] (curriculum for a degree in Sharia), with 
A Summary of the Study Plan for Undergraduate Department: Law, JAZAN UNIVERSITY, https:// 
ryanscoville.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/law-degree-curriculum-jazan-university.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8GUF-567Z] (curriculum for a law degree). 
 110. See, e.g., Curriculum in Jurisprudence, Hue University, http://web.archive.org 
/web/20140824235038/http://hueuni.edu.vn/portal/index.php/vi/chuongtrinhdaotao/detail/68 
[https://perma.cc/7LP2-B2QS]. 
 111. See ROBERTS, supra note 101 (manuscript at 165–67, 171–73). 
 112. See id. (manuscript at 182–88). 
 113. See id. (manuscript at 190–99). 
 114. See Ryan Scoville & Milan Markovic, How Cosmopolitan Are International Law Pro-
fessors?, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 119, 131 (2016) (analyzing the professional backgrounds of 
2017] INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL SCHOOLS  1469 
 
invisible college of international lawyers, but a collection of “separate but overlap-
ping epistemic communities, with different areas of expertise” and varying levels of 
national orientation.115 This condition suggests that students of international law not 
only learn about different issues to different degrees, but also receive instruction that 
is informed by divergent perspectives on the nature and function of the discipline.  
Training in municipal law within each state, by contrast, does not exhibit such 
significant variation. In fact, law school curricula within a national jurisdiction often 
appear to exhibit high levels of uniformity: faculties typically teach the same sub-
jects, using the same vocabularies, authorities, theoretical frameworks, and even text-
books, and they do this on the basis of shared ideologies, similar professional back-
grounds, and comparable resources. In part, such uniformity is government-imposed. 
National regulations require all law schools in Brazil, for example, to teach compul-
sory courses on tax and labor law,116 and law schools in Slovenia to mandate courses 
on criminal sentencing and the law of the European Union.117 In India, instruction 
includes a compulsory class on environmental law.118 But intrajurisdictional uni-
formity also appears to be sociological and organic. For instance, many American 
torts professors have gravitated toward the use of economic principles,119 and even 
without a federal mandate, virtually all law schools across the United States teach a 
compulsory course on federal constitutional law.120 These forms of national uni-
formity might have a number of sources, including the common professional sociali-
zation of scholars within a state, the dominance of only a single legal tradition within 
most states, and evidence that wealth tends to be distributed more evenly within a 
state than across the entire globe.121 For international law, these contributors to stand-
ardization are substantially absent. 
                                                                                                             
 
international law professors at 150 American law schools).  
 115. ROBERTS, supra note 101 (manuscript at 37); see also Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, 
Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2011) (identifying 
differences between American, Chinese, and European views of international law). 
 116. Portaria No. 1.886, 30.12.1994, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.], art. 6(II) (Braz.), 
http://www.oab.org.br/arquivos/pdf/LegislacaoOab/LegislacaosobreEnsinoJuridico.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/46P4-5BP9]. 
 117. See Pravilnik o Zahtevanih Temeljnih Pravnih Znanjih Magistrov Prava za Sprejem 
v Sodniško Pripravništvo, 93 Uradni List R.S. no. 93/2008 (Slovn.), http://www.uradni 
-list.si/1/objava.jsp?urlid=200893&stevilka=3942 [https://perma.cc/7TD2-F2C7] (listing cur-
riculum requirements for the degree of magister prava). 
 118. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA: PART IV, RULES OF LEGAL EDUCATION 23–24 (2008), 
http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/BCIRulesPartIV.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/U3TQ-UNQN]. 
 119. See Daria Roithmayr, A Dangerous Supplement, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 80, 84 n.7 (2005). 
 120. See supra note 10 (noting that Harvard Law School does not require students to study 
U.S. constitutional law). 
 121. Cf. RESEARCH INST., CREDIT SUISSE, GLOBAL WEALTH REPORT 19 (2015), 
https://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/?fileID=F2425415-DCA7-80B8-EAD 
989AF9341D47E [https://perma.cc/9RUW-J37Y] (reporting that the top one percent of global 
wealth holders owns half of all household assets in the world).  
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II. THE INFLUENCE OF LEGAL TRAINING ON LAWYERS 
Having established that cross-national variation exists, the next step is to theorize 
on its significance. In the analysis that follows, I argue that the most likely process 
by which global variations in legal education might affect the efficacy of interna-
tional law is one of student persuasion.122 This process is essentially linear, beginning 
when universities exert meaningful influence over the way in which future practi-
tioners view international law, and culminating where personal views obtained from 
the university setting manifest as individual behaviors of support or disregard for that 
law once students enter their professions. Of course, this process can occur only 
insofar as legal training communicates something about the discipline of interna-
tional law, and only insofar as the operative message is sufficiently influential not 
only to overcome contrary attitudes that students might carry with them into law 
school, but also to generate new attitudes that persist over time and in the face of 
countervailing influences that may arise in subsequent professional settings. This is 
a tall order, and I am under no illusion that education always generates such trans-
formative effects. At the same time, there is substantial evidence that formal training 
can be a potent source of influence. One might even say that it is inevitable for uni-
versities to socialize students to internalize privileged views, given certain standard 
features of the university environment. What is not inevitable is the direction and 
degree of that influence, which depend heavily upon the particularities of the training 
context, the chosen set of graduation requirements, and how those requirements are 
                                                                                                             
 
 122. To be clear, I do not contend that international legal education matters only because 
it can persuade students. Law schools are academic institutions, but they are also social envi-
ronments that can exert substantial pressure to conform to privileged views that students may 
or may not privately accept. They are also suppliers of knowledge that students have material 
incentives to exploit in law practice. Conceivably, these characteristics shape the efficacy of 
international law in ways that have nothing to do with whether training can convince students 
to view the discipline in privileged ways. Cf. RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING 
STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013) (distinguishing 
between persuasion, acculturation, and material inducement as forms of social influence). Stu-
dents might, for example, temporarily espouse pro- or anti-international-law positions because 
they perceive that doing so will bring social rewards in the form of faculty or peer approval. 
Or they might closely study and later utilize what they learned in the classroom because doing 
so will bring financial or other professional rewards. And it is possible that law schools so-
cialize non-students. See generally John W. Meyer, The Effects of Education as an Institution, 
83 AM. J. SOC. 55 (1977) (discussing how schools socialize both students and non-students by 
sorting them into positions of higher or lower social status). I nevertheless focus on student 
persuasion because I see it as the mechanism most likely to explain legal education’s possible 
influence over the efficacy of international law. In particular, it is unclear how the accultura-
tion that happens in law school could carry long-term significance, given that students are only 
in that setting for a short period and will inevitably encounter new and potentially contrary 
social environments as professionals. Moreover, the mere incentive to utilize knowledge ac-
quired in the classroom tells us little about how graduates might do so—one could use doctrinal 
knowledge to undermine international norms as much as to promote them. And non-student 
socialization strikes me as a comparatively indirect source of influence, given that the students 
who become lawyers are most centrally involved in the interpretation and utilization of 
international law. 
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implemented. This Part employs evidence on political socialization and social psy-
chological studies on persuasion to suggest that the manner in which a law school, 
university, or state decides to approach the issue of international legal training may 
play a significant role in determining student views and, later, professional behavior 
with respect to the subject.  
A. The Evidence of Influence 
Numerous studies on political socialization have tested the effects of post-
secondary education on student attitudes and values. Simply put, much of this work 
shows that education is influential. At a general level, a variety of longitudinal stud-
ies have found that undergraduates tend to adopt political identities that align with 
the normative environment that predominates among faculty and peers.123 Other 
studies have documented that academic majors affect student interests124 and that 
college attendance generates statistically significant improvements in commitment 
to civic involvement,125 racial and ethnic understanding,126 and gender egalitarian-
ism,127 even after controlling for a range of variables. Similar dynamics also appear 
to occur abroad128 and in professional and graduate schools.129 For example, one 
study found that graduate-level training not only explained the professional role ori-
entations of scientists and engineers employed at a major American aerospace 
company, but also that subsequent experience in the workplace failed to change or 
otherwise manipulate those orientations.130 Another reported that students’ career 
preferences generally evolved to align with the faculty’s academic priorities131—stu-
dents in research-oriented departments were more likely than counterparts in other 
departments to shift toward research careers.132  
More importantly, a handful of studies have suggested that legal education can 
influence the values and political views of students.133 One reported anecdotal 
                                                                                                             
 
 123. E.g., ALEXANDER W. ASTIN, WHAT MATTERS IN COLLEGE? FOUR CRITICAL YEARS 
REVISITED 150–59 (1993). 
 124. See JOHN C. SMART, KENNETH A. FELDMAN & CORINNA A. ETHINGTON, ACADEMIC DISCI-
PLINES: HOLLAND’S THEORY AND THE STUDY OF COLLEGE STUDENTS AND FACULTY 139–71 (2000). 
 125. E.g., WILLIAM E. KNOX, PAUL LINDSAY & MARY N. KOLB, DOES COLLEGE MAKE A 
DIFFERENCE? LONG-TERM CHANGES IN ACTIVITIES AND ATTITUDES 97 (1993). 
 126. E.g., Jeffrey F. Milem, College, Students, and Racial Understanding, 9 THOUGHT & 
ACTION 51 (1994). 
 127. E.g., ASTIN, supra note 123, at 143. 
 128. See, e.g., Roderic A. Camp, University Environment and Socialization: The Case of 
Mexican Politicians, 20 HIST. EDUC. Q. 313, 314 (1980). 
 129. See, e.g., D.A. Ondrack, Socialization in Professional Schools: A Comparative Study, 
20 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 97, 101–02 (1975) (finding that nursing schools influenced the attitudes and 
values of their students). 
 130. George A. Miller & L. Wesley Wager, Adult Socialization, Organizational Structure, 
and Role Orientations, 16 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 151, 161 (1971). 
 131. David Gottlieb, Processes of Socialization in American Graduate Schools, in 
SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 258, 260–68 (Ronald M. Pavalko ed., 1968). 
 132. Id. at 264–65. 
 133. See James R. Elkins, Becoming a Lawyer: The Transformation of Self During Legal 
Education, 66 SOUNDINGS 450, 451 (1983) (concluding that law school “significantly alters” 
1472 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:1449 
 
evidence that a substantial portion of a sample of American legislators first became 
interested in politics while in law school.134 A detailed case study on student 
socialization at one elite school observed that “an identity formed by collective 
eminence limits the occupational horizons of the great majority to one path of 
achievement”—namely, employment at large corporate law firms in big cities.135 
Still another revealed correlational evidence that law school alters legal orientations, 
ideologies, and values.136  
Equally significant, extensive research has established that particular university 
courses can change student attitudes and behaviors. For example, statistical analyses 
have consistently found strong evidence that the completion of even a single 
women’s studies course can yield substantial and enduring improvements in student 
views and behavior with respect to gender equality, openness to diversity, and in-
volvement in social activism.137 One representative study conducted pre- and post-
course tests of two groups at a random sample of thirty-two universities, with one 
group comprising students who enrolled in a women’s studies course and the other 
comprising students who enrolled in a non-women’s studies course.138 Even after 
                                                                                                             
 
student identity and experiences of the world); Howard S. Erlanger & Douglas A. Klegon, 
Socialization Effects of Professional School: The Law School Experience and Student 
Orientations to Public Interest Concerns, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 11 (1978) (finding evidence 
that law school exerts modest influence over student interests, values, and modes of thinking); 
S.D. Ross, The Role of Lawyers in Society, AUSTRALIAN Q., Mar. 1976, at 61, 65–66 (relating 
findings that law schools in Australia increase political liberalism among their students); 
Robert Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 681–84 (1973) (finding 
that nearly half of those interviewed at Yale Law School reported change in their political 
views during their first year); Wagner P. Thielens, Jr., The Influence of the Law School 
Experience on the Professional Ethics of Law Students, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 587 (1969) (finding 
that the law school experience led students to internalize more ethical attitudes about 
appropriate professional behavior); see also Leonard D. Eron & Robert S. Redmount, The 
Effect of Legal Education on Attitudes, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431, 443 (1957) (“[T]he selection of 
legal training and the learning process itself are, in part, a psychological experience. It pro-
foundly affects attitude formation and change, and, as such, influences the development of 
professional role and professional practices.”); Samuel E. Wallace, Reference Group Behavior 
in Occupational Role Socialization, 7 SOC. Q. 366 (1966) (finding that student aspirations to 
gain acceptance into the legal profession cause them to adopt professional values). 
 134. Allan Kornberg & Norman Thomas, The Political Socialization of National Legisla-
tive Elites in the United States and Canada, 27 J. POL. 761, 771 (1965). 
 135. Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, Learning Collective Eminence: Harvard Law 
School and the Social Production of Elite Lawyers, 33 SOC. Q. 503, 518 (1992); see also 
Robert Granfield, Legal Education as Corporate Ideology: Student Adjustment to the Law 
School Experience, 1 SOC. F. 514, 516–17 (1986) (finding that many students at an elite law 
school gravitated toward “business/corporatist ideology” because of their law school 
experience). 
 136. Gregory J. Rathjen, The Impact of Legal Education on the Beliefs, Attitudes and Val-
ues of Law Students, 44 TENN. L. REV. 85, 94 (1976). 
 137. Dozens of studies have reported similar findings. For a survey, see 2 ERNEST T. 
PASCARELLA & PATRICK T. TERENZINI, HOW COLLEGE AFFECTS STUDENTS: A THIRD DECADE 
OF RESEARCH 271–344 (2005). 
 138. See Jayne E. Stake & Frances L. Hoffmann, Changes in Student Social Attitudes, Ac-
tivism, and Personal Confidence in Higher Education: The Role of Women’s Studies, 38 AM. 
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controlling for variables such as class characteristics and pedagogical differences, 
the researchers found that the students in the first group were significantly more 
likely to demonstrate increases in egalitarian views on gender and likelihood of fu-
ture activism.139 Likewise, courses on racial and ethnic diversity have been shown to 
result in lower levels of prejudice and more concern for the promotion of racial un-
derstanding.140 Additional research has demonstrated the causal significance of 
coursework on other topics for relevant attitudes and behaviors,141 and that the act of 
taking multiple courses can produce cumulative effects.142 These effects appear to 
persist over time,143 specifically depend on curricular content,144 and occur regardless 
of both the level of initial student interest in the subject matter145 and the degree to 
which students’ original views were consistent with the course’s normative 
orientation.146  
Perhaps even more relevant is a forthcoming study by Andrew Bell, who con-
ducted a repeated cross-sectional survey of hundreds of freshman and senior cadets 
at the U.S. Military Academy and U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps  
(ROTC) to assess the influence of military training on cadets’ views regarding norms 
of noncombatant immunity and the law of armed conflict.147 Bell found that training 
effectively socialized cadets to be more sensitive toward the treatment of civilians in 
wartime, and that the intensity of training correlated with the magnitude of the atti-
tude change that occurred.148 Cadets at the Academy, who undergo more intensive 
training than their ROTC counterparts, experienced a significant and more robust 
shift in their views on principles of distinction, necessity, and proportionality.149  
The premise of the training thesis is modest: law school courses on international 
law are not inherently any less influential than the courses that existing scholarship 
                                                                                                             
 
EDUC. RES. J. 411, 415–20 (2001). 
 139. See id. at 420–34. 
 140. These findings have also been widely replicated. See, e.g., Mitchell J. Chang, The 
Impact of an Undergraduate Diversity Course Requirement on Students’ Racial Views and 
Attitudes, 51 J. GEN. EDUC. 21, 35 (2002). 
 141. See, e.g., James R. Moran, Social Work Education and Students’ Humanistic Atti-
tudes, 25 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 13 (1989). 
 142. Betsy Palmer, The Impact of Diversity Courses: Research from Pennsylvania State 
University, DIVERSITY DIGEST (Winter 2000), http://diversityweb.org/digest/W00/research.html 
[https://perma.cc/LH5H-X3AK]. 
 143. See, e.g., Jayne E. Stake & Suzanna Rose, The Long-Term Impact of Women’s Studies 
on Students’ Personal Lives and Political Activism, 18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 403, 410 (1994).  
 144. See id. at 404; Jayne E. Stake, Laurie Roades, Suzanna Rose, Lisa Ellis & Carolyn 
West, The Women’s Studies Experience: Impetus for Feminist Activism, 18 PSCYHOL. WOMEN 
Q. 17, 23 (1994). 
 145. See Stake & Hoffmann, supra note 138, at 431–32. 
 146. See Jeanne M. Sevelius & Jayne E. Stake, The Effects of Prior Attitudes and Attitude 
Importance on Attitude Change and Class Impact in Women’s and Gender Studies, 33 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2341, 2342 (2003). 
 147. Andrew Bell, Can Military Training Change Combatant Norms? Comparing the 
Effects of Ethics and Law of War Training at the U.S. Military Academy and Army ROTC 
(Dec. 1, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on file with the Indiana Law Journal). 
 148. See id. (manuscript at 35–40). 
 149. Id. (manuscript at 38). 
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has already evaluated. Around the world, many future legal practitioners obtain their 
training as undergraduates, just like the students involved in the research on women’s 
studies and diversity courses.150 Others receive their legal training as graduate stu-
dents, but it is not clear that the incremental differences in age and institutional con-
text are material.151 Indeed, as I explain below, it is entirely plausible that training on 
public international law is more effective, on balance, at socializing both under-
graduate and graduate students than the other courses that have received primary 
attention in the political socialization literature.152  
To be sure, the existing evidence is not entirely uniform—some studies have 
found that education does not generate attitude or value change,153 including in law 
schools.154 For instance, a researcher who tested for changes in career interests, atti-
tudes, and personality characteristics at one school concluded that the “marked sta-
bility . . . reflected in [the] data strongly indicate that law school graduates are gen-
erally law school freshman grown older.”155 Such studies suggest that international 
legal training will not necessarily make a difference. But they also seem inadequate 
to establish that specific training requirements are necessarily or even usually in-
consequential. First, they are against the weight of the evidence showing that course 
content matters.156 Second, most of them did not test the efficacy of purposeful 
efforts to induce attitude change through the curriculum;157 for all we know, the law 
schools under examination did not even attempt to influence students along the meas-
ured dimensions. Thus, the best conclusion seems to be that even limited amounts of 
formal education are generally capable of shaping student attitudes. The next chal-
lenge is to explain why. In Part II.B., I undertake that project by identifying the class-
room as an ideal setting for persuasion.  
B. The Mechanism of Influence 
Social psychological research on persuasion offers a framework for understanding 
how even limited training can yield lasting effects. To explain, I employ the field’s 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), which is an influential theory of persuasion 
                                                                                                             
 
 150. See supra text accompanying notes 137–40. 
 151. There is abundant evidence that socialization can occur well into adulthood. See 
Jeylan T. Mortimer & Roberta G. Simmons, Adult Socialization, 4 ANN. REV. SOC. 421 (1978) 
(surveying the literature on postchildhood socialization). 
 152. See infra text accompanying note 180. 
 153. See, e.g., Carol Copp, Scholarly Belief and Attitude Formation: The Case of the Radi-
cal Economics Paradigm, 25 SOC. FOCUS 121 (1992) (finding that postgraduate economics 
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nificant attitude change among students on the issue of personal participation in politics). 
 154. See, e.g., Avrom Sherr & Julian Webb, Law Students, the External Market, and So-
cialization: Do We Make Them Turn to the City?, 16 J.L. & SOC’Y 225, 228 (1989). 
 155. James E. Hedegard, The Impact of Legal Education, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 791, 865 
(1979). 
 156. See supra text accompanying note 144. 
 157. See, e.g., Sherr & Webb, supra note 154, at 227–29. 
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in the contemporary literature158 and has been found to explain persuasion across 
disparate cultural contexts.159 The ELM proposes that people are generally motivated 
to hold “correct” attitudes, but will use varying levels of cognitive effort to process 
persuasive communications, depending on the circumstances.160 A person with a 
strong motivation and ability to process a particular message is more likely to engage 
a so-called “central” processing route that entails high levels of cognitive elaboration 
on the merits of the arguments contained within the message.161 This might include, 
for example, careful scrutiny of an argument’s internal logic or the strength of the 
underlying evidence. But where the motivation or ability to process is limited, a per-
son is likely to engage a “peripheral” route that entails lower levels of cognitive elab-
oration, such as reliance on heuristics or contextual cues that are unrelated to the 
merits of the message. One person can simultaneously use both central and peripheral 
routes, but there is a zero-sum relationship such that more extensive central pro-
cessing necessarily entails less reliance on peripheral cues.162 For present purposes, 
what is critical about the ELM is its suggestion that persuasion is contextual—moti-
vation and ability determine the processing route, which in turn dictates whether the 
particular characteristics of the message content, source, and recipient will render the 
communication sufficiently influential to change the recipient’s attitude in the man-
ner desired by the source. In the analysis that follows, I argue that legal training can 
engage central-route processing; that messages conveyed through the curriculum can 
be persuasive under conditions of high cognitive elaboration, given common features 
of the university setting; and that the attitude changes that result from curricular per-
suasion can manifest in professional behavior. The takeaway is significant: while 
contemporary theorists of international law are right to treat socialization as relevant, 
they may be looking for it in the wrong place—the most promising venue is not an 
elite international organization or foreign ministry, but instead the ubiquitous, even 
mundane, classroom through which all lawyers must pass.  
1. Central-Route Processing in International Legal Education 
Experimental research suggests that the university setting is more than capable of 
ensuring that students process curricular content primarily—even overwhelmingly 
—along the ELM’s central route. This is true for several reasons.  
First, an individual is more likely to carefully analyze a message that is clearly 
linked to her values, accomplishment of personal objectives, or ability to justify a 
position to others in a socially satisfactory manner.163 Social psychologists have re-
                                                                                                             
 
 158. See RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: 
CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE 3 (1986). 
 159. Jennifer L. Aaker & Durairaj Maheswaran, The Effect of Cultural Orientation on Per-
suasion, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 315 (1997). 
 160. PETTY & CACIOPPO, supra note 158, at 5–11. 
 161. Id. at 6–7. 
 162. Id. at 141–65.  
 163. See Blair T. Johnson & Alice H. Eagly, Effects of Involvement on Persuasion: A Meta-
Analysis, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 290 (1989); Richard E. Petty, John T. Cacioppo & Rachel 
Goldman, Personal Involvement as a Determinant of Argument-Based Persuasion, 41 J. 
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ferred to these linkages as value, outcome, and impression involvement, respec-
tively.164 As an example, one study found that the quality of the arguments made in 
favor of a new university exam policy was a more important determinant of policy 
acceptance among students who had reason to believe that the policy would affect 
their ability to graduate, but that peripheral cues such as source expertise mattered 
more among those who had been led to believe that the policy would take effect only 
after they graduated.165 In essence, students had a stronger incentive to think hard 
about the policy’s merits when they perceived its personal relevance.  
Common features of university instruction suggest that similar dynamics can en-
courage central processing in the classroom. Value involvement may flow from nor-
mative messaging that encourages students to think about course content in terms of 
personal values.166 Outcome involvement may result both from the perceived practi-
cal need to understand the material as a future professional, and from exams, which 
can tether course content to academic and career goals by converting topical 
knowledge into performance outcomes that affect graduation and employment pro-
spects. Impression involvement can in turn result from class discussions and assign-
ments, both of which incentivize students to learn the material to present themselves 
in a favorable light to peers and faculty.  
Second, individuals are more motivated to engage in central processing when they 
have been primed to adopt an active self-concept that matches a message frame pre-
determined by the source of the communication.167 For instance, researchers in one 
experiment primed participants to extraversion or introversion by exposing them to 
words associated with one of those traits, and then had them read a product adver-
tisement containing both arguments of high or low quality and language that matched 
or mismatched the primed trait.168 The result was that, regardless of original person-
ality, participants paid more attention to argument quality when the language in the 
ad matched the prime.169 Priming thus molded active self-concepts so that recipients 
would think more carefully about messages delivered in accordance with speaker-
selected frames.170 There is a sense in which this is also common in the university 
setting, which can prime students to engage in central processing by repeatedly em-
phasizing the value of intellectual and professional ends that only careful thinking 
                                                                                                             
 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 847 (1981). 
 164. See Johnson & Eagly, supra note 163, at 290–93.  
 165. See Petty et al., supra note 163, at 852–54. 
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Priming and the Differential Use of Dimensions in Evaluation, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 405, 414–15 (1990) (reporting findings consistent with this conclusion). 
 170. In a sense, this is the opposite of the personal relevance concept discussed above, 
which hinges on the idea that a speaker can generate central processing by matching a message 
frame (i.e., that of self-relevance) to recipients’ predetermined self-concepts. 
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can generate and then supplying a matching frame of sophistication in the class-
room—the frame of the furrowed, professorial brow; chin-stroking pedanticism; rar-
efied nomenclatures; and the proud but arcane idiosyncrasies of the ivory tower.  
A cluster of simpler dynamics can also encourage extensive cognitive elaboration 
in the classroom. For instance, a moderate level of message repetition promotes cen-
tral processing by creating more opportunities for recipients to scrutinize the mes-
sage’s merits.171 Personal interaction between the message source and recipient,172 
the use of multiple message sources,173 and the absence of distractions174 also en-
hance the motivation or ability to elaborate. Moreover, individuals who by disposi-
tion tend to engage in and enjoy effortful analytic activity are more likely to employ 
central-route processing than those who do not.175 Universities can easily take ad-
vantage of these phenomena. Faculties can utilize relatively intimate classroom set-
tings, with few external distractions, to expose students to course themes repeatedly 
over time. And insofar as college and graduate students are more cognitively moti-
vated than the general public, the message will have a receptive audience. In short, 
the standard university classroom is an ideal venue for central processing.  
This is a venue, moreover, in which the cognitive effort that occurs should tend 
to be relatively bias free, for a couple of reasons. First, limited prior knowledge about 
the subject of a communication facilitates unbiased information processing, while 
extensive prior knowledge has the opposite effect.176 In essence, only people with 
relevant knowledge are motivated to process new information in a way that protects 
their preexisting views—their counterparts have nothing to protect. This is signifi-
cant because, almost by definition, students tend to have limited knowledge on the 
subject matter of a new course. Second, even with prior knowledge, message recipi-
ents tend to engage in unbiased processing when the subject of the communication 
is of little emotional significance to them,177 when their knowledge is not easily re-
trievable from memory,178 or when they are led to believe that others will evaluate 
                                                                                                             
 
 171. John T. Cacioppo & Richard E. Petty, Effects of Message Repetition on Argument 
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CONSEQUENCES 283, 290–93 (Richard E. Petty & Jon A. Krosnick eds., 1995). 
 178. See Wendy Wood, Retrieval of Attitude-Relevant Information from Memory: Effects 
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PSYCHOL. 798 (1982). 
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them on the validity of their conclusions.179 The emotional significance and mne-
monic accessibility of attitudes will of course vary among students, but the account-
ability mechanisms of testing and class participation can provide a strong incentive 
to process information anew, without simple reliance upon preexisting attitudes or 
schema.  
Here, too, the training thesis makes a modest claim: the social psychological evi-
dence on the determinants of central versus peripheral routes, and biased versus un-
biased processing, applies to the persuasive communications that occur in interna-
tional legal education. As in other contexts, thoughtful pedagogy can create a robust 
incentive for students to expend significant cognitive effort learning new material, 
prime students to think like lawyers and then deliver a matching frame, enable per-
sonal interaction between professors and students, provide repetitious messaging, 
utilize multiple message sources such as lectures and casebooks, and eliminate 
distractions.  
If anything, there is reason to believe that training on public international law can 
yield even more robust and unbiased central processing than the courses that have 
received primary attention in the political socialization literature. I would imagine, 
for example, that international law students generally have less prior experience and 
bias concerning the subject matter of their training than the students who completed 
the courses on gender and racial diversity—two issues on which everyone has not 
only some form of personal exposure, but also culturally ingrained viewpoints that 
can be difficult to budge. Moreover, it is conceivable that law students, particularly 
in countries where legal education happens at the graduate level, are on average 
higher in dispositional need for cognition than undergraduates such as those studied 
in the research on political socialization. And insofar as law students are more likely 
to have identified their future vocation than many undergraduates, the knowledge 
that their coursework carries at least some practical significance generates an even 
greater incentive for careful thinking. For these students, law is not simply an elective 
or a major, but an impending career. 
The degree to which central and unbiased processing occurs will of course vary 
among schools and courses. Where training in international law is not required, and 
where professors do not skillfully employ techniques to encourage central pro-
cessing, it is likely that few students will think hard about the subject.180 But the 
mechanisms discussed above suggest that it is well within the power of legal educa-
tors to encourage students to think hard and objectively.181 This conclusion carries 
two significant consequences. First, once central processing is engaged, there is a 
distinct set of variables that will influence the degree to which the study of interna-
tional law yields attitude change among students. And second, attitude change under 
central processing can produce behavioral consequences. I take up these issues next.  
                                                                                                             
 
 179. See Robert A. Schuette & Russell H. Fazio, Attitude Accessibility and Motivation as 
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PSYCHOL. BULL. 704 (1995). 
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2. Attitude Change Under Central-Route Processing 
Where a professor of international law successfully engages unbiased central-
route processing among students, there are multiple reasons to think that formal in-
struction can yield attitude change. Some of the reasons are intuitive and concern 
common attributes of the instructional message itself.182 For instance, messages are 
more persuasive under central processing when they draw on evidentiary support,183 
explicitly rebut counterarguments,184 and possess an open-ended quality that encour-
ages recipients to draw their own conclusions.185 Persuasion in this context also de-
pends in part on stylistic features. The inclusion of metaphors,186 for example, and 
the use of language that projects social status and confidence187 both increase the 
likelihood of attitude change under central processing. A couple of studies on evalu-
atively biased language—that is, language implying a particular normative orienta-
tion on the subject matter to which it relates—have also found that the words con-
tained in the message can themselves produce attitude change.188 In one experiment, 
university students formulated arguments about a proposed weekend driving ban for 
adolescents after receiving a presentation containing either a set of pro-ban language, 
such as “road safety,” “protective,” and “effective,” or anti-ban language, such as 
“patronizing” and “scapegoat.”189 The researchers found not only that the biased lan-
guage produced parallel shifts in attitudes, but also that the resulting attitudes per-
sisted after the exposure.190 One way to understand these findings is to view the use 
of evaluatively biased language as a form of issue framing, which media studies have 
shown to affect attitudes among the public.191  
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The source of an instructional message in the university setting also helps to ex-
plain how formal training can yield attitude change. Perhaps most importantly, pro-
fessors as a group tend to enjoy substantial credibility in the sense that students gen-
erally perceive them as both knowing the “correct” views within their discipline, and 
as motivated to communicate those views accurately and without expectation of per-
sonal gain. Such perceptions significantly enhance persuasion even under central 
processing.192  
Student attributes also play a role. Unsurprisingly, it is easier to persuade individ-
uals who lack easy access to beliefs and memories of prior experiences regarding the 
subject of a persuasive communication.193 One researcher has hypothesized that this 
is true because individuals without such access have a harder time generating 
counterarguments.194 Whatever the underlying cause, it goes without saying that this 
phenomenon operates in the university setting, it being the case that most students 
possess comparatively limited knowledge and experience regarding a new discipline. 
In the aggregate, these phenomena indicate that the classroom is an ideal setting 
in which to generate attitude change through significant cognitive elaboration. It is 
ideal in part because so much is within the control of the professor—it is up to her 
whether to marshal evidence in favor of any particular message, whether to address 
counterarguments, whether to employ metaphor and empowered and evaluative lan-
guage, and whether to frame issues in a way that shifts their salient features so as to 
elicit audience agreement. It is an ideal setting, moreover, because it allows faculty 
to employ tools of persuasion repeatedly over an extended period to a captive audi-
ence that is highly motivated to understand. And it is ideal due to the common per-
ception of a substantial disparity between the knowledge and experience of the mes-
sage source and of the recipients, the credibility that professors tend to enjoy, and the 
fact that novices of any kind are usually more impressionable. Given the social psy-
chological evidence, it is little wonder that courses on women’s studies, racial diver-
sity, and the law of armed conflict have been able to generate attitude change among 
students; it is hard to think of a better setting for persuasion through central-route 
processing. 
Once again, the claim of the training thesis is modest: the dynamics that social 
psychologists have shown to contribute to attitude change under conditions of high 
cognitive effort can also operate in the context of international legal training, includ-
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ing to promote or undermine student internalization of the idea that public interna-
tional law is important and binding. The relevance of most of the tools discussed 
above is obvious, but it is worth adding that the discipline of international law carries 
with it a whole basket of evaluatively biased language. To say that a party “breaches” 
a treaty, for example, is to evoke a comparison with contracts, which unquestionably 
enjoy legal enforcement. To say that the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council can “vote” on and “veto” proposed authorizations for the use of force is to 
suggest that legal process governs Council operations. Even the term “public inter-
national law” overtly claims legal status for international norms. In these ways, the 
lexicon of public international law is self-promoting to the point where even an oth-
erwise neutral discussion of the discipline unavoidably uses a terminological frame 
that encourages pro-compliance views. 
I will take this a step further. Just as there is reason to think that more central 
processing happens in the standard law school classroom than in the courses covered 
by the political socialization literature, there is reason to think that messages about 
international law in law school—whether pro or con—can be even more effective at 
producing attitude change than those conveyed in the courses on women’s studies 
and racial diversity.195 In part, this is due to a likely imbalance between the topic-
relevant knowledge and experience of new students in these fields, with new 
international law students seemingly having less of each and, as a result, being more 
impressionable.196 It is also, in part, a product of the fact that many law professors 
possess something that college professors in non-professional disciplines lack: 
membership in a guild to which their students aspire to belong. The in-group status 
of “lawyer” should intensify the persuasive influence of legal academics among pro-
spective practitioners by adding a unique and potent form of additional credibility 
and influence. And finally, legal education should be more effective at generating 
attitude change than other types of formal training insofar as law schools tend to 
inculcate within students a general sense of deference to hierarchy and authority,197 
the result of which is to elevate the persuasive influence of those who deliver the 
curriculum. 
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3. The Behavioral Effects of Attitude Change 
Of course, even if formal training persuades students to adopt new attitudes on 
legal issues, it does not necessarily follow that those attitudes will matter. Separate 
research shows that the certainty, extremity, emotional intensity, and subjective im-
portance of an attitude affect its strength and resulting influence over cognition and—
most importantly—behavior.198 It is questionable whether these variables will oper-
ate robustly with respect to the study of international law. Students with academic 
exposure to the discipline may remain uncertain about the status of global norms, 
hold moderate and unemotional attitudes about compliance, and perceive the disci-
pline as tangential to their professional goals. Moreover, upon becoming practition-
ers, they might forget what they learned, change their mind in light of other messages, 
or simply choose not to act in accordance with views they internalized during law 
school. If the attitudes generated by curricular messages about international law are 
weak, then there is little reason to think they will affect how graduates behave, and 
the training thesis cannot explain state action. 
But this line of reasoning seems overly pessimistic. In fact, a number of consid-
erations support the view that attitudes acquired through training can influence the 
behavior of practitioners even over the long term. First, there is a great deal of evi-
dence that attitudes can affect cognitions and behavior,199 and that attitudes devel-
oped through significant cognitive effort are substantially more influential than those 
acquired via the peripheral route.200 For instance, many of the same variables that 
shape an individual’s motivation and ability to think carefully about a message also 
affect the persistence of the attitude changes that result.201 Just as message repetition, 
dispositional need for cognition, and personal relevance intensify a recipient’s ability 
and motivation to engage in central processing, they also lead the recipient to 
maintain a newly acquired attitude for a longer period of time.202 Researchers have 
interpreted this parallel to mean that central-route attitudes are more likely to 
endure.203 Additionally, experiments have shown that attitudes resulting from 
extensive elaboration on a message are more resistant to subsequent, 
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counterattitudinal argumentation204 and are more likely to guide behavior.205 
Particularly noteworthy is that the duration and amount of careful thinking that 
occurred in these experiments is far less than that which occurs during even a single 
course on international law. One of the studies, for instance, found evidence that a 
single, momentary exposure to an advertisement can generate behavioral effects 
when consumers think carefully about the message.206 A fortiori, extensive and 
elaborate cognitions about international law based on repeated message exposure 
over the course of many weeks can also influence behavior. One explanation for this 
effect is that, having thought carefully about the merits and implications of a 
message, a recipient who has undertaken substantial elaboration will tend to hold 
greater confidence in the correctness of the resulting attitude, which will in turn 
embolden him to maintain it, resist counterattitudinal appeals, and enact it 
behaviorally.207 Another explanation is that the cognitive effort that central 
processing entails makes the resultant attitude more accessible in memory and thus 
available to facilitate counterargumentation and guide behavior.208  
Second, the prediction of behavioral consequences makes sense in light of prim-
ing theory, which posits that individuals ordinarily do not exhaustively analyze the 
merits and implications of the various judgments and choices that they make, but 
instead rely on the knowledge that is the most accessible in memory at the time of 
decision.209 In ELM terms, accessible knowledge operates as a heuristic influence on 
behavior when individuals lack the motivation or ability to engage in more substan-
tial elaboration. This theory enjoys substantial empirical support210 and helps to ex-
plain, for example, how media emphases on selected political issues can shape public 
perceptions of the President and voting behavior.211 Another way to think about the 
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training thesis is to view international legal training as a prime that supplies topical 
knowledge and attitudes that are accessible later to guide action when the practi-
tioner’s motivation or ability to rethink fundamental issues such as the legitimacy of 
international law is more limited. The prime is powerful insofar as the central-route 
processing that happens in law school produces accessible attitudes,212 and because 
individuals who are less knowledgeable about a subject are more susceptible to 
primes.213  
Finally, even assuming that the attitudes resulting from training on international 
law at times lack sufficient strength to influence behavior, they are not unavoidably 
weak. Thoughtful pedagogy can magnify attitude strength by enhancing the cer-
tainty, extremity, emotional intensity, and subjective importance of the compliance 
question among students. One study has found, for example, that the repeated artic-
ulation of an attitude has the effect of elevating its personal importance to the 
speaker.214 Courses and other forms of training, such as clinics, that encourage stu-
dent participation might capture this effect. Likewise, the evidence on the persuasive 
influence of credible sources suggests that the certainty and extremity of student at-
titudes will depend at least in part on the clarity and intensity with which faculty 
members convey a particular compliance message.215  
In summary, substantial evidence supports the first premise of the training thesis. 
There is an abundance of empirical support for the idea that education in a university 
setting can affect student attitudes and behavior. Thus, regardless of whether facul-
ties choose to persuade future practitioners with a message that favors or disfavors 
public international law, it is plausible and even likely that the chosen message will 
—when skillfully delivered—yield lasting effects on the individual and collective 
behavior of law graduates. In a sense, lawyers are what law schools make of them. 
III. THE INFLUENCE OF LAWYERS ON THE STATE 
For the training thesis to shed light on the efficacy of international law, it must 
next be true that law graduates who have been persuaded to support or disregard 
international law exert meaningful influence over the compliance decisions of the 
states in which they reside. In this Part, I discuss studies supporting this idea, illumi-
nate the processes by which professional influence can occur, and then suggest that 
cross-national variations in the formal structure of national governments will mediate 
the availability and significance of these processes. The analysis completes the pro-
cess of tracing the independent variable of training to the dependent variable of offi-
cial policy by connecting the effects of training to state action.  
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A. The Conversion of Professional Ideology into State Policy 
Individuals whose legal training has led them to support, disregard, or oppose 
public international law can shape state compliance in any of four basic professional 
roles: (1) as government elites with direct influence over compliance decisions and 
public opinion; (2) as activists who pressure the state to adopt or reject policies of 
obedience; (3) as private practitioners who may either utilize or ignore international 
law in the course of representing clients; and (4) as experts who shape popular per-
ceptions of international law through discourse. These roles are all independent, but 
the training thesis anticipates that they will operate in the same direction and in a 
manner congruent to the persuasive messages that legal professionals internalized as 
law students. I discuss each in turn.  
1. Lawyers as Government Officials 
The most obvious form of influence occurs when individuals with legal training 
occupy positions of power within the government, including positions such as 
judges, prosecutors, legislators, and foreign policy elites. Such influence has been 
common in much of the world for quite some time.216 Without even counting national 
judiciaries, Robert Putnam once observed that lawyers are politically prominent 
“[a]lmost everywhere” in that they “comprise roughly 15 to 25 percent of most na-
tional legislatures” and “have also traditionally supplied the lion’s share of the bu-
reaucratic elite in many countries.”217 The pattern is no accident. Government is a 
natural destination for lawyers insofar as their profession enjoys social status,218 the 
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ability to practice law intermittently facilitates forays into politics,219 lawyers’ mo-
nopoly of many law enforcement and judicial offices places them in a favorable po-
sition to occupy other official roles,220 and states’ utilization of law to impose order 
and inform policy making creates a pressing internal demand for legal expertise.221  
Scholars have found anecdotal evidence that the lawyers who hold public office 
tend to exert a unique and non-trivial influence over the state.222 For example, based 
on a series of interviews and other research, Laura Dickinson found that American 
Judge Advocate Generals have generated demonstrable improvements in the U.S. 
military’s compliance with international law by training, advising, and investigating 
troops.223 Michael Scharf reported several instances in which the United States chose 
to comply with international obligations specifically because of advice from the 
Office of the Legal Adviser in the State Department.224 In part, this influence flows 
from the formal prerogatives that accompany public office: Some officials with legal 
backgrounds possess authority to make national policy. Others are institutionally po-
sitioned to inject legal considerations into a policy calculus. Still others wield power 
to exercise enforcement discretion on a retail basis. In part, influence also results 
from the persuasive force of legal expertise,225 which receives considerable deference 
in many societies around the world.226 The training thesis thus anticipates that law 
graduates oriented to promote or disregard international law as government officials 
will, in aggregate, be able to exert meaningful influence over state action. 
This line of thinking draws support from research on the causative power of ideas 
in policy making, including anecdotal evidence that the topical and ideological ori-
entations of university training shape state behavior by molding future elites.227 For 
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instance, David Law and Wen-Chen Chang have found that justices on the 
Taiwanese Constitutional Court routinely consult foreign law in deciding cases, and 
that there is a “strong correlation” between the patterns of this practice and the jus-
tices’ educational backgrounds228—justices who obtained a master’s or doctoral de-
gree in Germany were responsible for a clear majority of the Court’s citations to 
German law, while those with American legal training were responsible for a major-
ity of the citations to U.S. law.229  
Similarly, in an historical account of U.S. trade policy, Judith Goldstein has found 
that national interest is incapable of explaining why the United States retained pro-
tectionist policies well into the twentieth century, given that the nation would have 
benefited from low tariffs much earlier.230 Instead, U.S. policies at the time were a 
product of the domestic hegemony of protectionist economic ideas, which condi-
tioned the way in which political elites interpreted events and crowded out alternative 
paradigms.231 Most intriguingly, Goldstein notes that free-trade ideas began to pre-
dominate in university classrooms much earlier, but nevertheless failed initially to 
influence government elites due to a lack of political interest and the inability of 
academic economists to communicate effectively with policymakers.232 It was not 
until the diffusion of these ideas in the 1930s, after “a generation of students [had 
been] trained in classical economics,” that the United States undertook a major shift 
toward lower tariffs.233 Academic economists, it appears, had not become any more 
effective at communicating with government elites, but their old students, some of 
whom were now policy makers, had themselves become influential vectors of the 
ideas that began to dominate in the classroom years before.234 The result was an am-
ple supply of liberal solutions to the crisis of the Great Depression and, ultimately, a 
fundamental shift away from protectionism.235 These findings suggest that formal 
training remains influential even decades after it occurs.236 Scholars have argued that 
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ideas affect policy in these types of cases by supplying vocabularies that define and 
limit the range of possible actions,237 serving as lenses that color the processing of 
new information238 and perceptions of self-interest,239 and providing conceptual or-
ganization in a world of incomplete information and uncertainty.240  
Research on public opinion suggests an additional but less direct form of influ-
ence. In a twist on the traditional model of democratic governance, which posits that 
government officials act to effectuate public preferences, social scientists have found 
that mass publics often form their opinions about political and social issues by taking 
cues from government elites.241 Officials’ rhetorical support for or disagreement with 
even expert opinions on salient social issues tends to yield matching effects among 
the general public.242 This can happen when an issue is of direct and immediate per-
sonal relevance to a population, such as whether to raise local taxes, but it is more 
common and robust on issues of greater abstraction.243 Theorists have proffered a 
couple of explanations. One is that members of the public tend to lack sufficient 
knowledge and motivation to rigorously evaluate complex policy issues, so they rely 
on the positions of trusted officials as decisional shortcuts.244 A more Machiavellian 
take is that elites are able to manipulate public opinion by deploying issue frames to 
encourage the public to think about policy along strategically selected dimensions.245  
There is reason to anticipate that elite cues and frames will be influential, specif-
ically on matters of international law compliance. First, historically, most of the 
American public has not devoted significant effort to independent thinking on 
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international affairs, due to a perception that the subject carries only limited and 
indirect personal relevance.246 Insofar as this is also true of the public in other states, 
the result may be a general willingness to rely on elite cues. Second, an uninformed 
public is more vulnerable to framing effects.247 Given evidence that national publics 
often lack even basic knowledge about international affairs,248 much less arguments 
about the status and contours of international law, it seems to follow that elite frames 
on compliance issues can shape public opinion. In fact, a series of recent experiments 
suggests as much. One found that between two groups of subjects exposed to a 
message about U.S. interrogation methods in the war on terrorism, those who read 
an additional message that the methods violate international treaties were more likely 
to disapprove of the U.S. practice than those who received no international law 
message.249 Other work has shown similar effects in different areas of international 
law and policy.250 Legally trained elites may be able to capture these dynamics by 
strategically deploying or omitting arguments about the international legal 
implications of contested policies. 
Inevitably, within any given state, there will be groups of political elites who favor 
or oppose compliance with international law for ideological or other reasons, regard-
less of legal training. The training thesis contends simply that the size and influence 
of those groups will vary depending on the attitudes with which generations of law-
yers enter government service. Where law schools influence future government elites 
to discount international law, government institutions oriented toward the discipline 
will have a harder time generating interdepartmental and interbranch support for 
compliance, which will in turn complicate efforts to generate pro-compliance poli-
cies and concordant cues and frames for the public. Where law schools influence 
future elites to view international law as real law, the opposite is more likely to occur. 
2. Lawyers as Activists 
A second form of influence occurs when individuals with legal training operate 
as activists within civil society to pressure the state to adopt a particular course of 
action on an issue that implicates international norms. Legally trained activists can 
influence state policy through both institutional and other means; some might engage 
in litigation, lobbying, or voter drives, while others might organize boycotts or 
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demonstrations to mobilize public opinion. That these types of individuals have at 
times exerted substantial influence over state policy hardly requires extensive elab-
oration here. Even just a few names make the point: Thurgood Marshall,251 Raphael 
Lemkin,252 Peter Benenson,253 and influential members of the founders of the United 
States.254  
International relations theorists have elaborated on the various means by which 
civil society actors shape compliance decisions. Some of this work focuses on how 
transnational networks comprising NGOs and individual activists contribute to the 
development of international norms. Richard Price, for example, found that a collec-
tion of transnational groups was primarily responsible for the emergence of a global 
norm against the use of antipersonnel land mines.255 These actors generated and dis-
seminated information to teach states that land mines were a problem, networked 
with governments and international organizations to access and influence the policy-
making process, ensured that their campaign resonated with national publics by graft-
ing it onto a preexisting and widely accepted ban on weapons of mass destruction, 
and shifted the burden of proof against land mines by demanding that states publicly 
justify any use.256 Other scholarship focuses on how transnational activists contribute 
to state compliance with extant norms. For instance, Amy Gurowitz has shown that 
human rights advocates in Japan wielded international human rights covenants to 
argue more forcefully against national policies that discriminated against Koreans 
and migrant workers.257 Audie Klotz found that, notwithstanding countervailing na-
tional interests, transnational anti-apartheid activists successfully mobilized U.S. 
support for sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s by framing apartheid in terms 
of a prevailing civil rights discourse of racial equality and obtaining access to those 
with decision-making power in government.258 And in a noteworthy book, Thomas 
Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink collected case studies suggesting that 
transnational networks effectively diffuse international human rights norms and gen-
erate compliance even among recalcitrant states by raising moral consciousness, mo-
bilizing domestic opposition, and persuading international actors to apply pressure 
in favor of new policies.259 On this particular account, the networks are effective 
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because of their ability to generate both pressure and dialogue—a target state initially 
responds to accusations of unlawful behavior by denying the validity of an applicable 
international norm, but then offers tactical concessions to dampen mounting criticism 
and, eventually, in the course of arguing with network agents, internalizes the norm’s 
validity and starts to comply.260  
The training thesis connects with this literature by suggesting that national legal 
communities are important nodes in the transnational networks that researchers have 
found capable of generating norm internalization and obedience. Not only can law-
yers provide resources to full-time activists, such as financial support or expert coun-
sel; they can also operate as norm entrepreneurs through creative litigation;261 form 
or contribute to organizations that lobby for policies of compliance or disregard;262 
serve as sources of expertise for government elites grappling with international prob-
lems;263 and exert influence through non-institutional means such as rallies, strikes, 
and demonstrations.264 The training thesis contends that the number of individuals 
able and motivated to engage in these behaviors will vary with the nature of the in-
ternational legal training that occurs in the domestic setting.  
What is particularly intriguing here is that, if they so choose, members of national 
legal communities are well positioned to be at least as influential as many of the 
activists covered in the literature on transnational networks. This is in part because 
lawyers often go into government service, as discussed above.265 But it is also true 
because they know the “rules of the game,” often possess substantial financial means, 
interact with each other and political and economic elites, and tend to enjoy profes-
sional esteem. These forms of power suggest that, in the terminology of neoliberal 
international relations theory, communities of lawyers with specific and education-
ally derived orientations on international law might constitute one of the interest 
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groups that scholars have found to exert influence over foreign policy.266 In the dif-
ferent terminology of social movements theory, legal professionals might matter be-
cause their expertise, status, and social connections amount to important intellectual, 
cultural, and organizational resources that a transnational network can marshal in 
favor of or against state action with international legal implications.267 These profes-
sionals are established polity members who collectively wield sufficient influence to 
see that the decision-making process accounts for their interests,268 and are influential 
allies who can create or foreclose political opportunities for norm internalization.269 
Thinking about legal professionals in these ways transforms the case studies on trans-
national networks into indirect but additional empirical support for the training the-
sis—if civil society influences compliance and lawyers are influential members of 
civil society, then lawyer activists matter to compliance. And if these lawyers matter, 
then we should be concerned with the sources of their ideas about international 
norms. 
3. Lawyers as Practitioners 
A third form of influence occurs when lawyers enact in private law practice the 
orientations that they obtained from their training. Among those who studied inter-
national law and internalized the view that it counts as “real law,” the enactment 
manifests as the inclusion of international legal principles and insights in advice to 
clients; in claims, defenses, and arguments before courts; and in communications 
with opposing parties. Among those who received no education on international law, 
or who received an education that downplays the status of the discipline, the enact-
ment tends to be one of silence—the omission of international rules from practice, 
even when relevant. The difference reflects the reality that circumstance never com-
pletely dictates the laws and arguments that one employs in the course of client rep-
resentation; there is always room for creativity and discretion. It also reflects the fact 
that lawyers can deploy rules of law to serve client interests only when they know 
and understand them. And it reflects the condition that a lawyer’s choice of argu-
mentation inevitably reflects his or her subjective perception of persuasive merits. 
Even where domestic rules of legal ethics encourage creativity and analytical rigor 
by demanding vigorous representation, those rules do little to promote the utilization 
of international norms when lawyers and the broader profession hold preexisting per-
ceptions of the norms as sublegal, ineffective, and irrelevant.  
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There is anecdotal evidence that these differences manifest regularly in courts and 
law offices around the world. In the United States, where historically only a small 
minority of practitioners has taken even one course on international law,270 lawyers 
often overlook relevant doctrines and rules. For example, Sandra Babcock notes that 
in the first two decades immediately following U.S. ratification of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, criminal defense lawyers hardly ever raised ar-
guments based on the treaty because “few law school graduates understand the rele-
vance of international law in domestic legal proceedings.”271 She attributes this ten-
dency to the fact that “[i]nternational law is not a required subject in the vast majority 
of law schools in the United States.”272 Similarly, with respect to Japan, another 
country that does not require training in international law, Amy Gurowitz observed 
that “Japanese courts . . . are reluctant to deal with arguments based on international 
law, in part because they tend to be relatively unfamiliar with it.”273 Under the train-
ing thesis, none of this is accidental or even surprising; national fluency in interna-
tional law corresponds closely with whether and to what extent prospective practi-
tioners acquire training in the discipline. 
It is probably true that lawyers in some countries avoid arguments based on inter-
national law not because of limited personal knowledge or hostility, but simply be-
cause they anticipate that the arguments will be unpersuasive to others. For instance, 
Philip Trimble has suggested that lawyers prefer to use constitutional rather than in-
ternational law in criminal trials in U.S. courts because constitutional law is more 
familiar and persuasive to American judges.274 But this observation calls for further 
inquiry on why international law is less persuasive in the first place. Judges must 
acquire their views about international law from somewhere. Would they find inter-
national authority to be more persuasive if they had studied the discipline and inter-
nalized pro-compliance attitudes during law school? And would they find interna-
tional law more compelling if American lawyers did? Would a steady stream of 
international claims and arguments elevate the status of this body of law in the eyes 
of the judiciary? The training thesis says yes, yes, and yes.275 There is nothing inher-
ently unpersuasive about international authority. 
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4. Lawyers as Experts 
The fourth and final form of influence occurs when individuals with legal training 
act as experts to provide counsel and opinion on matters of international law. There 
is a sense in which the other roles each encompass this one, given that they envision 
influence derived in part from authoritative claims to special forms of knowledge. 
But the role of a legal expert differs from the others in that it is, by appearances at 
least, less partisan and more committed to objectivity. Unlike the lawyer as 
government elite, the legal expert is not constrained by bureaucracy or political 
expediency. Unlike the lawyer as activist, she intentionally avoids partisan advocacy 
and commits to no cause other than an unbiased explication of legal principles. And 
unlike the practitioner, she is not a mercenary. Graduates might acquire this role by 
becoming legal academics, public intellectuals, certain types of media commentators, 
and the like.  
The legal expert’s influence derives both from what she says and who she is. By 
writing in academic journals and providing public commentary to news media, she 
identifies previously unrecognized problems, proposes solutions, resolves un-
certainties, and supplies interpretations. Because of her qualifications, nonpartisan 
status, and the complex or technical nature of the problem at hand, she attracts an 
audience. Her opinions are capable of generating sizable shifts in public opinion276 
and can exert substantial influence over policy makers, including those involved in 
foreign policy.277 This influence appears to derive in part from an ability to frame the 
way in which others understand issues,278 in part from third-party reliance on exper-
tise as a low-effort heuristic that suggests credibility and encourages deference,279 
and in part from the way in which a comparative lack of personal experience and 
knowledge limits the audience’s capacity to counterargue. 
The claim of the training thesis is that the persuasive messaging that occurs in the 
classroom will also affect the tenor of expert opinion on matters of international law. 
Where the socialization process is effective, the long-term result will be a “body of 
conventional knowledge strong enough to compel agreement among differently pre-
disposed users.”280 Generations of legal experts will arrive at an orthodoxy on the 
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status and value of international law writ large, even if they disagree about the con-
tent or application of particular norms. This orthodoxy will not only color the con-
clusions that the experts provide to others, but serve as a force multiplier in the per-
suasion process as third parties realize that even otherwise diverse commentators 
agree on fundamental principles. Put differently, the creation of expert orthodoxy on 
matters of international law is an intergenerational process, and law schools are at 
the center of it. Whether future experts promote or undermine international law is 
partially up to the current experts who shape tomorrow’s consensus. That consensus 
will in turn shape the conclusions of both government elites and the nature and tenor 
of national discourse on compliance questions as experts communicate their in-
formed views to a receptive public.281  
This conclusion finds support in research on epistemic communities.282 Interna-
tional relations scholars have developed an impressive array of case studies showing 
that these groups are able to empower or limit the influence of ideas by wielding their 
expertise to provide the public and government decision makers with advice about 
the likely consequences of policy options, frame issues for discussion, develop fixes, 
and identify state interests.283 As an example, Emanuel Adler has shown that an ep-
istemic community of American scientists and civilian strategists was instrumental 
in generating a shift in U.S. nuclear policy toward bilateral arms control from the 
1950s to the early 1970s.284 Members of think tanks and university faculties began 
by cultivating and packaging a set of new ideas involving the utility of technical 
verification measures, insights from game theory, and the limitations of deterrence 
at conferences and in academic publications.285 These experts then worked to convert 
their theories into national policy by acquiring influence within the government.286 
Community members had the ear of President Eisenhower, their ideas acquired bu-
reaucratic support with the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
they won congressional allies who disseminated pro-arms control views to the pub-
lic, and many of them obtained important positions within the executive branch.287 
Moreover, these same individuals played a critical role in persuading an initially 
skeptical group of elites from the Soviet Union to also pursue arms control.288 One 
important product was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which the United States and 
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Soviet Union signed in 1972 to place limitations on ballistic missile defenses.289 
Additional case studies have observed comparable influence in such diverse policy 
domains as international trade,290 whaling regulations,291 food aid,292 international 
banking,293 Mediterranean pollution control,294 and efforts to stem the spread of AIDS.295  
This research bolsters the training thesis insofar as a national collection of law-
yers, policy makers, and academics working in the discipline of international law 
constitutes an epistemic community. As one example, Frans van Waarden and 
Michaela Drahos contend that an epistemic community comprising legal scholars, 
lawyers, judges, policy makers, and business consultants with expertise in competi-
tion law was the most important force behind a convergence toward stricter antitrust 
norms in EU member states.296 In their account, national convergence happened or-
ganically, without either market integration or explicit EU efforts to harmonize state 
legislation, because community interactions in academic and professional fora facil-
itated a transnational exchange and diffusion of ideas and promoted consensus 
among community members, who in turn utilized their domestic influence to ensure 
that the community episteme shaped policy at home.297 Framed in similar terms, the 
training thesis posits that domestic approaches to the study of international law will 
shape compliance by empowering or limiting the influence of domestic and global 
epistemic communities of international legal experts. Where training is pervasive, 
rigorous, and supportive, the epistemic community will be able to diffuse its exper-
tise more broadly and establish influence over a larger number of future government 
elites, which will in turn promote compliance. Where training is limited, poor in 
quality, or hostile, the domestic epistemic community will have a harder time acquir-
ing influence, and any transnational or international counterpart will suffer from 
fewer national collaborators.  
In summary, university courses can affect compliance because they can shape the 
ideas that generations of students internalize about international law, and students 
can later act under the influence of those ideas as government elites, activists, law 
practitioners, and experts. This thesis does not claim that the collective influence of 
law graduates in any single role will necessarily suffice to yield parallel state action. 
But it does posit that such a scenario is possible. Moreover, assuming common 
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training, it suggests that waves of new lawyers executing a multiplicity of 
professional roles will act under the influence of the same messages about 
international law, and that the aggregate influence of these individuals is sufficient 
to shape the manner in which a state approaches the question of compliance. Thus, 
while the international system is anarchic in the sense that there is no global 
institution with general legal authority to coerce sovereign states, legal training can 
influence state compliance policies. The international order does not dictate 
international law’s irrelevance; anarchy is in part what law schools make of it.  
B. Regime Type as a Mediator 
Even if all curricula were identical, it is unlikely that training’s influence would 
remain constant among different states. Inevitably, cross-national variables will me-
diate the extent to which individual professional attitudes translate into state policies 
of compliance with or disregard for international law. Perhaps the most important of 
these is the type of governmental structure under which a national collection of law 
graduates operates. Much of the preceding analysis and supporting evidence assumes 
a democratic state that leaves a domestic legal community with multiple avenues of 
influence, but of course many states substantially depart from that model in ways that 
will affect the manner and possibly the extent of professional sway over the policy-
making process. Part III.B. draws on the work of Jeffrey Checkel and Thomas Risse-
Kappen, among others, to offer a typology of domestic regimes and then to 
hypothesize on how each might mediate training’s effects.298 I anticipate that whether 
and how law schools teach international law can affect compliance rates even in il-
liberal states, but that the professional roles that matter will vary by regime type.  
The first step in this analysis is to recognize simply that there are different forms 
of national governance structures under which professionals might work to promote 
or undermine obedience. Checkel proposes that there are four basic structural cate-
gories, each of which has a unique effect on the mechanisms by which international 
norms diffuse domestically.299 First, in a liberal structure, “the role of elites is highly 
constrained” and policy is formed from the bottom up, the result of which is that 
“societal pressure explains the domestic empowerment of global norms.”300 Checkel 
offers the United States as an example.301 Second, at the opposite end of the typology 
is the state-above-society structure, which has a “‘top-down’ policy-making environ-
ment.”302 In this category, typified by the former Soviet Union, the domestic empow-
erment of international norms depends exclusively on elite learning.303 In between 
the two extremes are corporatist and statist structures in which societal pressure and 
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elite learning share influence.304 Government elites in the corporatist category have 
more influence than their counterparts in liberal states, but social pressure is still the 
most important determinant of norm empowerment.305 The example here is the 
Federal Republic of Germany.306 Finally, in the statist structure, exemplified by 
France, relative influence is simply reversed: societal pressure is not irrelevant, but 
learning by government elites plays a more dominant role.307  
This typology operates in tension with the training thesis insofar as it suggests 
that there are states in which the preferences of government officials do not matter. 
As the preceding analysis makes clear, there is quite a bit of evidence that officials 
will always exert some form of material and independent influence over state action, 
whether by directly injecting their preferences into policy or by providing cues that 
help to mold public opinion.308 The result is that the existence of truly liberal states 
is questionable—most, including the United States, fall into the other three catego-
ries. But Checkel’s analysis is nevertheless useful, for in suggesting that national 
governance structures generally dictate the mechanisms of norm empowerment, the 
typology offers a starting point for hypothesizing about the more specific issue of 
cross-national variation in the means by which lawyers are able to translate profes-
sional ideology into state policy.  
Checkel’s ideas are easy to extend. For example, insofar as there are truly liberal 
states, activists, practitioners, and experts should exert the most significant influence 
over compliance policies—activists by mobilizing public opinion or lobbying gov-
ernment actors, practitioners by incrementally incorporating international norms into 
private transactions and dispute resolution, and experts by shaping public opinion. 
Public officials in these states should, by contrast, hold limited, if any, influence, as 
the government acts simply to effectuate societal demands. At the other extreme, 
where the state is above society, activists and independent law practitioners should 
have far more limited influence, while government elites should dominate as they 
decide policy free of popular pressures. In this context, independent legal experts 
might also play a role, but only insofar as they help to shape the views of official 
decision makers, rather than by influencing public opinion. Likewise, it may be dif-
ficult for private practitioners in states with top-down structures to generate compli-
ance due to the absence of an independent judiciary. To put these ideas more con-
cretely, legal training will matter mostly for its effect on future government lawyers 
and expert consultants in statist or state-above-society regimes such as Iran and 
Cuba, but more for its effect on future activists, private practitioners, and public in-
tellectuals in liberal regimes such as Canada and Sweden.  
Another possibility is that regime type influences the degree of professional in-
fluence over compliance decisions. It is plausible, in other words, that the effect of 
training is more substantial under liberal and corporatist structures because these 
leave open more avenues by which lawyers can transform their professional orienta-
tions into state action. Policy is not simply a product of elite decision making, but 
rather the aggregation of activist, practitioner, and expert influences, all of which will 
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tend to point in the same direction, whether in favor of or against compliance, 
depending on the nature of the training that occurs. If accepted, this proposition 
would mean that legal training is most effective at explaining compliance rates in 
comparatively liberal states. It is also plausible, however, that professional influence 
is more intense under statist and state-above-society structures, because these grant 
government elites substantial freedom to transform their attitudes about international 
law directly into state policy. Only a relatively small number of individuals with legal 
backgrounds will have influence, but their influence will be more substantial because 
the closed political structure excludes societal actors who might possess interests 
contrary to the predominant professional orientation.309 If accepted, this proposition 
would mean that legal training is more effective at explaining the compliance rates 
of illiberal governments that include government lawyers in their decision-making 
processes. Given a dearth of empirical testing, I offer no conclusions on these points 
other than to say that they are possibilities that future research should consider. 
But even if domestic political structures influence the means and degree to which 
law schools influence compliance, the training thesis contends that legal education 
will always generate congruent policy effects over the long term. There are two rea-
sons for this. First, the multiplicity of professional roles available to individuals with 
legal training renders law schools’ influence resilient. For legal training not to matter, 
there must be a state in which legal education occurs but graduates are never govern-
ment officials, activists, law practitioners, or experts. That is essentially a null set. 
Second, scholars have shown in a variety of case studies that activists are able to 
influence state action regardless of regime type.310 Margaret Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink go so far as to suggest that domestic human rights activists can bypass the 
state and even change domestic structures by networking with international allies to 
generate multiple sources of pressure for reform.311 As discussed above,312 legal 
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education can play a role in these dynamics by substantially influencing the number 
of individuals who are sufficiently informed and motivated to press for action. 
IV. MERITS AND IMPLICATIONS 
To recap, the argument is that there are significant global disparities in interna-
tional legal education, and that this condition likely limits the efficacy of 
international law by socializing influential professionals to understand and value in-
ternational law in divergent ways, thereby generating varying levels of official un-
derstanding and concern for international norms. A variety of evidence from the field 
of social psychology suggests that legal education can persuade law students to adopt 
attitudes about public international law that faculties have chosen to privilege, and 
that those attitudes may be sufficiently robust to persist after graduation and influ-
ence professional behavior. Where formal instruction is pervasive, rigorous, and ide-
ologically oriented to support the discipline, classes of law graduates are more likely 
to identify and use international law, and to consider carefully and act in accordance 
with a pro-compliance message on covered topics. Where training is optional, un-
available, or lacking in rigor, or where professors frame the discipline in an un-
favorable way, the effect could range from ignorance to a sense that international law 
is peripheral and unequal to domestic law, plus parallel behavioral consequences. In 
turn, evidence from political science suggests that law graduates may wield sufficient 
collective influence to ensure that their attitudes affect state policy. By the transitive 
property, universities could materially influence the efficacy of international law. 
This thesis, to be clear, does not anticipate that training is the only determinant of 
national policy. Nor does it make any claim about the relative importance of legal 
training in comparison to other conceivable influences. Nor, finally, does it suggest 
that training will produce immediate effects. The idea is simply that law schools 
might over time exert material influence over the way in which a government under-
stands international law and approaches decisions about whether to adhere to it. Be-
low, I discuss the merits and implications of thinking about global norms in this way.  
A. Merits 
From a theoretical standpoint, the training thesis has several strengths. First, it 
brings psychology back to its natural home by focusing on the mental processes that 
occur within human beings. A sizable volume of legal scholarship has incorporated 
insights from social psychology, but much of this work has treated juridical entities 
such as states as the unit of analysis.313 Insofar as entities cannot think other than 
through the human beings that comprise them, such an approach risks error by per-
sonifying abstractions and overlooking the aggregations of individual cognitions that 
determine institutional behavior. By treating the microprocesses of human psychol-
ogy as a key source of institutional behavior, the training thesis avoids this problem.  
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Second, the thesis draws attention to a potentially important source of norm 
internalization, and one that legal scholars and political scientists typically ignore. 
The vast literature on norms includes a number of works that focus on government 
agencies and international organizations as persuasion venues. Martha Finnemore, 
for example, explains that many states adopted national science policy bureaucracies 
in the mid-twentieth century because the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) taught national officials at international confer-
ences, in private meetings, and through correspondence that such bureaucracies are 
effective tools for achieving legitimate state interests in the coordination and direc-
tion of scientific research.314 I certainly do not deny that this sort of persuasion hap-
pens. But in the long run, the classroom is plausibly a more effective place for it. 
Consistent with the social psychological evidence discussed above, theorists have 
suggested that norm internalization is most likely where contact with a persuasive 
message is intense, significant in duration, and less politicized; where the persuadee 
has few ingrained beliefs on the subject matter and is in a novel or uncertain envi-
ronment; and where the persuader “is an authoritative member of the ingroup to 
which the [perusadee] belongs or wants to belong” and does not lecture “but, instead, 
acts out principles of serious deliberative argument.”315 It seems that these conditions 
describe classroom persuasion better than any alternative.  
Consider, for example, how elite socialization runs headlong into a couple of 
problems that student socialization largely avoids: First, individuals are more sus-
ceptible to persuasion when their preexisting, message-relevant cognitions are lim-
ited or otherwise inaccessible.316 This is a boon for student socialization, which tends 
to involve individuals whose limited prior exposure to a discipline makes them more 
impressionable,317 but a problem for elite socialization, which tends to involve estab-
lished professionals who may have acquired robust, issue-relevant schema through 
both education and substantial time in the field. Put differently, it will be easier to 
persuade John Bolton the law student than John Bolton the Under Secretary of 
State.318 Second, the use of culturally dissonant message frames tends to limit per-
suasion by undermining a message’s affective appeal.319 This tendency should com-
plicate international and foreign efforts to socialize domestic elites, who often will 
not share a common cultural background with the message source, but, if anything, 
contribute to persuasion in the law school setting. The idea here is that law 
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professors, who tend to come from the states in which they teach, will possess 
sufficient fluency in national culture to identify and utilize appropriate frames for 
greater persuasive effect. Put differently, cultural fluency makes it easier for an 
American law professor to persuade American law students than for a U.N. official 
from, say, Switzerland to persuade members of Congress, all else being equal.320 
Third, the thesis offers a deeper explanation for state behavior by suggesting that 
many of the phenomena and actors covered in the literature are simply intermediate 
variables that channel training’s influence. It may help to explain, for example, the 
domestic diffusion and empowerment of international norms.321 And it suggests a 
potentially important source of the attitudes that drive nonstate actors like norm en-
trepreneurs, activists, and epistemic communities to promote or undermine state 
compliance.  
Finally, the thesis appears more meritorious upon acknowledging the cognitive 
biases that might generate unwarranted skepticism among readers. One is a bias in 
favor of proximate causation—there is a natural tendency to assign greater relevance 
to independent or intervening variables that are closer in causal structure to a depend-
ent variable, even when distant causation is established.322 Applied here, this would 
manifest as an irrational tendency to discount the significance of universities in favor 
of variables that operate more directly on compliance decisions, such as contempo-
rary public opinion or bureaucratic pressures. A second is the so-called bias blind 
spot—people tend to view their own perceptions as less susceptible to bias than those 
of others.323 The result may be an unwarranted tendency to perceive oneself as an 
independent and neutral analyst who is immune from the influence of an idiosyn-
cratic intellectual upbringing. 
B. Implications 
Thinking about the evidence of global curricular variation in light of the training 
thesis generates a number of significant implications. Some of these hold regardless 
of one’s normative priors, but I frame others in a way that presupposes a commitment 
to effective international law. For readers who do not share that commitment, the 
prescriptions may be different, but either way, divergent normative preferences do 
not affect the causal argument; they merely inform what one does with it.  
First, the training thesis suggests a substantial research agenda. Additional empiri-
cal work is necessary to identify more fully the nature of cross-national differences 
in international legal education. Scholars might profitably supplement the 
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PILMap.org site with data on bar examinations, elective courses, casebook content, 
the professional backgrounds of international legal academics, and judicial and pros-
ecutorial training, among other topics. There are also important causal questions to 
explore: Does the completion of an introductory course on public international law 
yield attitude change among students? If so, how long does the change persist? In 
which types of national governments does legal education have the greatest effect on 
state policy? Why do some states compel the study of international law while others 
do not? And what are the concrete effects of cross-national differences for matters 
such as treaty compliance and popular attitudes about international norms? Scholars 
might profitably address these questions through both qualitative and quantitative 
studies and thus help to illuminate the role of universities as venues for the reflection 
and diffusion of international norms. 
Second, the training thesis suggests that there may be systemic barriers to the ef-
ficacy of international law even from a constructivist perspective. International law 
is formally universal, but the evidence described in Part I shows that it is, to varying 
degrees, practically parochial: many students graduate without obtaining even basic 
education about the discipline, while others acquire training that is poor in quality or 
peculiar in its topical emphases or ideological orientation. The likely result is a col-
lection of states with varying numbers of government elites, activists, private practi-
tioners, and experts who have studied international law, and varying levels of 
knowledge about and subjective commitment to international norms within those 
groups. If anything, such conditions may complicate enforcement by generating in-
consistency of understanding, irregularity of application, and confusion.  
To put the matter more concretely, the evidence from Part I supports hypotheses 
about the effects of legal education in and between specific countries. For instance, 
one might imagine that universities in Scandinavian states contribute to the efficacy 
of international human rights norms by requiring all students to complete courses 
that are analytically rigorous and norm-supportive.324 At the opposite extreme, legal 
education probably fails to contribute in any way to the domestic acceptance of in-
ternational norms in places like the Central African Republic, where functioning law 
schools do not appear to exist.325 In between these poles, universities in much of the 
developing world, such as India and many African states, generally require students 
to study international law but seem to lack the resources to take advantage of the 
classroom’s full persuasive potential.326 Insofar as professors do not possess the pro-
fessional background, teaching materials, or financial incentive to expend the time 
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necessary for effective instruction, it is doubtful that international law students in 
these states will have an adequate opportunity to understand their subject, let alone 
internalize robust attitudes about its claim to legal status. Parts of the developed 
world appear to suffer from a different problem. In countries like the United States, 
the issue is not one of instructional quality as much as one of pervasiveness and 
ideological orientation—international law is almost entirely elective, has not been 
particularly popular among students, and has a hard time distinguishing itself from 
foreign relations law.327 The probable consequences are limited knowledge among 
graduates and a general sense of uncertainty about the value of the discipline. For 
example, recounting his own experience as a student, David Kennedy explains that 
the marginal status of international law in his school’s curriculum left him “sceptical 
about the institutional stature that international law seemed to be claiming for itself” 
and feeling that the discipline was “subservient to a private municipal practice.”328 
In the aggregate, these kinds of conditions suggest a global order comprising states 
whose nationals hold varying levels of understanding and concern for international 
norms. This is an order in which noncompliance should come as no surprise. 
Of course, it is likely the case that, in any given state, elites with substantial in-
fluence over the foreign policy bureaucracy will be better trained in international law 
than the average graduate. In that sense, there will probably always be a class of 
knowledgeable domestic actors who both support the idea of international law and 
exert influence over state policy. But even insofar as that is true, the training thesis 
identifies a problem: where study is uncommon or lacking in rigor, most graduates 
will not have internalized robust attitudes on compliance questions, and any state 
decisions to follow international obligations are likely to result not from broad and 
deep commitment within domestic legal communities, but instead the work of a thin 
crust of elite specialists. In states where non-elite attitudes matter, commitments 
might be fragile. When even many law graduates do not understand international 
law, it may be overly optimistic to expect national publics to value compliance for 
its own sake. 
A third implication is perhaps the most tantalizing: the thesis would place the 
efficacy of international law partly in the hands of those who teach. This is probably 
an invigorating thought to many readers, but neither the degree, nor the direction, nor 
the cross-national uniformity of the classroom’s persuasive influence is a given. The 
degree to which instruction shapes student attitudes is likely to depend on a raft of 
nano-choices about the curriculum, pedagogy, and resource allocation. Individual 
professors will intensify the persuasive impact of their courses by requiring extensive 
class participation, selecting compelling reading materials, creating opportunities for 
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personal interaction with students, addressing counterarguments, providing students 
with opportunities to act in ways that approximate the roles of established practition-
ers, and otherwise approaching the quality of their instruction as a professional pri-
ority.329 The standard lecture is less likely to persuade.  
The direction of persuasion is also a choice. While the language and authorities 
of international law are generally norm supportive, there is ample space for different 
angles of approach. Just as one might lecture on ways in which the discipline has 
shaped state action, draw students’ attention to fundamental similarities with domes-
tic law,330 and otherwise frame international law in a positive way, one could easily 
highlight compliance problems and call into question the value of the field. Either 
way, the research suggests that there will be an attentive and impressionable 
audience. 
Still other choices concern the issue of cross-national uniformity. International 
law academics might promote uniformity through professional cosmopolitanism. 
They might seek out dialogue and collaboration with counterparts in other states, 
organize and attend international conferences, and work with foreign coauthors to 
diffuse and harmonize understandings across borders.331 Some of this happens al-
ready, but cosmopolitanism appears uncommon where it is needed most—namely, 
among scholars from different civilizations and states with antagonistic relationships. 
Ideally, we would see events like Sino-Japanese conferences on the law of the sea, 
papers coauthored by Indian and Pakistani scholars, and far more dialogue between 
Americans and Russians. There are real logistical challenges to reckon with here, 
including language and distance, but the alternative is insularity and the likely per-
petuation of cross-national difference. 
Law schools are not off the hook in this analysis. Much is up to individual pro-
fessors, but there are important organizational decisions to be made, including 
whether to make a course on international law mandatory, whether to offer few or 
many elective courses in the discipline, and whether to incorporate international top-
ics into courses that are traditionally domestic in orientation. Other choices might 
also make a difference, such as whether to promote and support international law 
journals, library acquisitions of international law volumes, and guest speakers on 
relevant topics. These types of environmental influences might supplement pro-
compliance messaging in the classroom by signaling international law’s status as a 
priority for not just one professor, but the law school as a whole. Given their outsized 
influence within the profession, elite law schools may play a particularly important 
role in deciding the popularization of these reforms.332  
The prescriptions here are obvious. Above all, academics should think hard about 
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pedagogy and approach instruction with an eye toward the compliance messages they 
send. These are issues of delicacy, in which minutiae can matter a great deal. My 
impression is that, at least in the United States, instruction tends to focus on a canon-
ical set of issues and cases regardless of persuasive consequences. For example, de-
cisions such as the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States)333 and the Case Concerning Avena 
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States)334 are not only common fare 
in American classrooms, but are common fare in substantial part because of the com-
pliance problems they expose. Such problems are undoubtedly of interest, but the 
amount of attention they receive suggests that even supporters of international law 
suffer from a certain lack of confidence. Most criminal law professors do not devote 
any of their introductory lectures to compliance issues even though violence and drug 
use are common. Why the difference? Perhaps it is time to rethink parts of interna-
tional law’s introductory canon. 
Fourth, the thesis could help to identify the practical significance of other com-
pliance theories, such as scholarship on transnational legal process by Harold Koh335 
and Abram and Antonia Chayes336 and, on the other side, rationalist analyses by 
scholars such as Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner.337 These works tend to come across 
as academic debates with limited practical significance. But the training thesis sug-
gests that they are critically important as source material for the narratives that fac-
ulties present to generations of future professionals. The persuasive merits of com-
pliance theories might affect state behavior by making it possible for instructors to 
present intellectually honest arguments consistent with a particular view about inter-
national law’s status, and by influencing the extent to which law schools are in fact 
able to persuade students to view international law as a body of genuine legal obli-
gations that require obedience. The content of a message, after all, is an important 
determinant of attitude change in central-route processing.338 To the extent that fac-
ulties side with and are able to draw students’ attention to a theory of compliance 
that is compelling, graduates are more likely to enter any number of professional 
roles with congruent views about the relevance and weight of global norms.  
There are also consequences for policy makers. While it is far from universal for 
states to require their law graduates to study international law, a number of them 
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do.339 Moreover, the UN General Assembly has repeatedly emphasized the im-
portance of this area of study,340 and some treaties specifically call for education on 
the rules they codify.341 The training thesis suggests that national governments and 
international organizations might profitably extend these efforts by agreeing, for-
mally or informally, to mandate and standardize international legal education, or 
even by promoting the idea of a nascent custom that obliges states to compel training. 
International actors may also view development assistance as a mechanism for im-
proving the efficacy of international law over the long run, and domestic policy mak-
ers may view governmental curriculum standards and bar examinations as compli-
ance issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Ideas matter. Education matters. Law graduates are collectively influential. These 
notions, each of which is uncontroversial, combine to sustain the plausibility of the 
training thesis. There is reason to think that anarchy is in part what law schools make 
of it. Stated another way, it is implausible that legal education has no effect on the 
efficacy of international law. As Peter Hall explained years ago:  
[I]deas acquire force when they find organizational means of expression. 
Most ideas have some power on their own: a number of people will be 
persuaded by them. But the social power of any set of ideas is magnified 
when those ideas are taken up by a powerful political organization, inte-
grated with other ideological appeals, and widely disseminated.342  
In this case, the powerful organization is the university. Attitudes about international 
law do not simply exist; they must come from somewhere, and it is reasonable to 
think that at least one of their principal sources is the classroom, which provides the 
only significant training on international law that most lawyers ever receive. If this 
is right, then national aggregations of small choices about curricular design and class-
room instruction carry significant policy consequences over the long run, and non-
compliance should come as no surprise, given the varied state of training around the 
globe. 
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